Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Arendt, Jaspers, Eichmann, and ex-post-facto law

            When one considers the Eichmann case, one is faced with the fact that Eichmann was being tried by a nation that didn't exist at the time he committed the "crimes" he was being charged with.  Beyond that, the laws defining those crimes were established by this nation that didn't exist (when he committed them) in 1950, at least five years after Eichmann committed them.  The trial itself commenced in 1961, at least 16 years after Eichmann committed them.
            On page 269 of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt writes, "Jaspers proposed that the court in Jerusalem, after hearing the factual evidence, 'waive' the right to pass sentence, declaring itself 'incompetent' to do so, because the legal nature of the crime in question was still open to dispute, as was the subsequent question of who would be competent to pass sentence on a crime which had been committed on government orders.  Jaspers stated further that one thing alone was certain: 'This crime is both more and less than common murder,'  and though it was not a 'war crime,' either, there was no doubt that 'mankind would certainly be destroyed if states were permitted to perpetrate such crimes.'
            "Jaspers' proposal, which no one in Israel even bothered to discuss, would, in this form, presumably have been impracticable from a purely technical point of view.  The question of a court's jurisdiction must be decided before the trial begins; and once a court has been declared competent, it must also pass judgment.  However, these purely formalistic objections could easily have been met if Jaspers had called not upon the court, but rather upon the state of Israel to waive its right to carry out the sentence once it had been handed down, in view of the unprecedented nature of the court's findings.  Israel might then have had recourse to the United Nations and demonstrated, with all the evidence at hand, that the need for an international criminal court was imperative, in view of these new crimes committed against mankind as a whole."
            I like Jaspers' proposal, but Arendt writes that he was being unrealistic.  Not only did no international court exist, but the U.N. had twice rejected proposals to consider the establishment of one.  Beyond that, Arendt writes on page 271, ". . . for Israel the only unprecedented feature of the trial was that, for the first time (since the year 70, when Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans), Jews were able to sit in judgment on crimes committed against their own people, that, for the first time, they did not need to appeal to others for protection and justice, or fall back upon the compromised phraseology of the rights of man -- rights which, as no one knew better than they, were claimed only by people who were too weak to defend their 'rights of Englishmen' and to enforce their own laws. (The very fact that Israel had her own law under which such a trial could be held had been called, long before the Eichmann trial, an expression of 'a revolutionary transformation that has taken place in the political position of the Jewish people' -- by Mr. Rosen on the occasion of the First Reading of the Law of 1950 in the Knesset.)  It was against the background of these very vivid experiences and aspirations that Ben-Gurion said: 'Israel does not need the protection of an International Court.'"
            COMMENT:  I would like to agree with Jaspers.  He answers all of my objections, but from a pragmatic point of view (as Arendt tells us) his recommendations would not work.  Beyond that there was the emotion coloring those times, as exemplified by Arendt's description of Ben Gurion.  All of which may mean that I needn't worry about what went on during the Eichmann and Nuremberg trials setting a precedent (fraught with a labyrinth of difficulties) of "victor's justice" because the "crimes" committed by the Nazis were unique in modern human history.
            But as soon as I write that I recall similar crimes committed by modern-day Islamists: cutting off the heads of hapless captives, blowing up civilians, etc.  But perhaps we have laws in place to deal with these modern crimes -- as we moved from treating them as civil crimes during the Clinton Administration to "war crimes" during the Bush and Obama administrations. 
            And just as there are probably few worrying about whether Eichmann and the other Nazis received fair trials, there will be few who will worry about the fair trials of captured Islamists who committed similar crimes.

Whether following orders "breaks the law"

Speranza wrote,


R. Paul reminisces that at his trial, Lieut. Calley said that he "was only only following orders (Captain Medina's)"

Oddly, the piece forwarded by Helm (and I must re-elaborate on Kramer's commentary) included:

From wiki, 'superior orders', cited by Helm:

"This is a legal defense that
essentially states that the defendant was
"only following orders" ("Befehl ist Befehl", literally
"order is order") and is therefore not
responsible for his or her crimes."

Oddly, I once played with Margaret Thatcher (scenario).

"So, what do you think of Thatcher's policy vis a vis the sinking of the Argentine battleship?".

B: Women are women.
A: War is war.

Grice considers both replies (WoW:"Logic and Conversation", slightly dissimilar scenarios).

Both answers are, as Grice notes, and the wiki entry too,


C: Befehl ist befehl.

Implicatures on which should follow suit. Or not.

Lawrence Helm responds:  Some of this was tied back to the Nuremberg trials and the trial of Eichmann in Israel.   Part of Eichmann's defense was that he was functioning in accordance with German Law.  He understood the orders he received to be lawful.   Eichmann was convicted and executed despite the fact that he didn't break the German laws that governed his actions. 
            I think Eichmann and most of the defendants at Nuremberg should have been either executed or imprisoned, but not because they broke German law.  Nor was there any higher law that could be appealed to.  There was not world court that they agreed to comply with.  It would have been more honest for the victors to have avoided the idea that those being tried "violated laws," because they didn't violate the laws that they lived under.  And it doesn't make good sense to say they violated our laws.  We no longer have laws to govern situations as they were in the past.  In the past the victors reserved the right to execute any or all of the enemies that had just been defeated.  If we are going to execute people as was done in Israel and Nuremberg then we need something like that. 
            Calley's defense was different.  Captain Medina gave Lieutenant Calley orders to demolish a village and told him there were no civilians in it.  The intelligence Medina based his orders on was wrong.  Calley was faulted because he encountered women and children that others thought should have convinced him that the orders were wrong.  However, women and children were used in attacks much as they have been by the Islamists so it is barely plausible that Calley didn't know they were merely civilians.  Calley was not well liked by the men under him so it is also plausible that they were not being objective when they faulted Calley.  On the other hand, I think that if I were there, based on what I know about the case (and about myself) I would have refused to shoot those people.  But many who like me were not there like to say something like that without really knowing what it was like to have experienced what they did.  I saw a documentary on Mai Lai not so very long ago and some of the soldiers that were there report that they still have nightmares over what they did back then.  I would like to think I would have done nothing that would have given me nightmares, but how can I (or anyone) be sure?  Giving them the benefit of doubt, Nixon was not necessarily wrong to have pardoned Calley. 

Monday, May 24, 2010

"Just following orders" revisited

            Now that Speranza has referred to some of my blog posts about Eichmann, I suppose I ought to say something.  When someone today says that she goes into a rage when some soldier says they were only following orders, I wonder if they haven' fallen into a time-loop from the Anti-War 60s.  The anti-American Communist Party-Line coming has collapsed; so if one wants to know what the Party "would have said" they must warm up some 60s instructions.
            Consider the problem in France after World War II [from page 201 of Beevor & Cooper's Paris, After the Liberation, 1944-1949]: "Communist attempts to establish a monopoly of working-class leadership were damaged from an unexpected direction.  The centerpiece of their propaganda in 1945 was the heroism of the Red Army.  But when the party strove to win over the recently returned prisoners of war and deportees, it discovered that many had returned to France horrified by the rape, looting and murder they had witnessed in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany.  Their stories spread.  Communist leaders in Paris were beside themselves with rage.  'No word against the Red Army must be permitted!' thundered Andre Marty at a mass meeting.  Posters appeared attacking those 'cynical Hitlerian scoundrels' who had infiltrated themselves 'to spread anti-Soviet calumnies' against 'the soldiers of the glorious Red Army who have saved the civilized world'."
            Earlier, beginning on page 197, Beevor and Cantor tell us, "In 1945, the French Communist Party was the most powerful political organization in the country, controlling a number of front organizations -- the National Front, the Union of French Women, the Union of French Republican Youth, a veterans' association and most of the largest unions within the CGT, the Confederation Generale du Travail.  But there were some striking weaknesses, especially in Paris and its suburbs, where membership had not even climbed back to the level of 1938.  Benoit Frachon, the Communist head of the CGT trades union movement, reported to Moscow: 'the principle reason . . . is due to a certain temporary disappointment among workers.  The workers were counting on a fundamental revolution in France and on social liberation immediately after the Germans were chased out.'  But what Frachon does not mention is that the loss of workers in the ceinture rouge suburbs was greater than acknowledge.  Their loss was partly camouflaged by the number of intellectuals joining the party in central Paris." 
            On page 200, Beevor and Cantor tell us the Communist Party was in an ideal position to make their "orders" available not only to the French Communists, but to the ordinary public.  Some of us in American worry about our "Press" being dominated by our anti-American "Left," but the French were in even worse straits after the war"The opportunities for expansion had been greatly increased at the Liberation, when buildings belonging to collaborationist organizations were expropriated.  The party's daily newspaper L'Humanite, for example, took over the building in the rue d'Enghien which had belonged to the populist newspaper Le Petit Parisien.
            "The Party owned a bank, the Banque du Nord, and a shipping line, France Navigation, which had been taken over during the Spanish Civil War, and was almost certainly bought with part of the gold reserves of the Spanish Republic, used to purchase Soviet military supplies. 
            "The party's publishing empire was huge, both in Paris and in the provinces.  It had twelve daily newspapers and forty-seven weeklies.  In addition, the Communist-run coalition, the National Front, had seventeen weeklies, all tightly controlled.  Instructions for 'political orientation' were issued each day to all provincial newspapers controlled by their front organization."
            COMMENT:  Note that the "rage" the French Communist party went into was after learning that some returning prisoners of war and deportees might report on the Red Army's "rape, looting and murder" they had witnessed.  This "rage" was directed against the witnesses to these rapes, lootings and murders and not against the Red-Army soldiers who committed these crimes.  Did this aforementioned lady who feels rage when she hears some [presumably American] soldier say "I was only following orders" (where she hears this she doesn't say) also feel rage when she heard about the aforementioned deprivations of the Red Army?
            The cynicism of the Left warming-over the 60s era Communist Party Line might put me into a rage if I was inclined to feel rage; which I am not.  I am merely a former Marine who has been interested in defending my country's interests.  I'll leave the "violence" and "rage" to the anti-American Pacifist Left.

            NOTE:  I've left intact R. Paul-Speranza research on the matter of whether a soldier ought always to obey superior.  Note that this information appears on an American military web site.  The French Communists issuing the daily "orders" to a gullible French public knew their beloved Red Army would never offer such information to their soldiers.

Lawrence Helm

-----Original Message-----
From: Jlsperanza
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 3:19 PM


In an earlier message dated 5/24/2010 6:45:47 P.M.,  [R. Paul writes]:

The phrase 'I was only following orders,' became  Eichmann's refrain in
Jerusalem, and nearly the only defense of his actions he  offered. In fact, I'd
say it was he who contributed it to the lexicon of  cynicism.


I think if you write "Speranza Eichmann" in google  you get Helm's hit!

--- So blame HIM!

But then there's 

'due obedience'. What does it stand for:

"I was only doing my  job".

Some fragments from the wiki entry on 'superior orders', below.

J. L. Speranza, Bordighera, etc.


            "Superior Orders (often known as the Nuremberg Defense or Lawful  Orders)
is a plea in a court of law that a soldier not be held guilty for  actions
which were ordered by a superior office.[1]"
            "The superior orders defense is similar to the doctrine of respondeat 
superior in tort law where a superior is held liable for the actions of a 
subordinate, and the subordinate may escape liability.[2] Legal scholars and war 
crimes tribunals define the superior orders plea as the complement to
Command  responsibility and may correlate or distinguish the plea from the
doctrine of  respondeat superior.[3]"
            "One of the most noted uses of this defense was by the accused in the 
1945-46 Nuremberg Trials, such that it is also called the "Nuremberg Defense." 
The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals, held by the main 
victorious Allied forces of World War II, most notable for the prosecution
of  prominent members of the political, military, and economic leadership of
the  defeated Nazi Germany. It was during these trials, under the London
Charter of  the International Military Tribunal which set them up, that the
defense of  "Superior Orders" was no longer considered enough to escape
punishment; but  merely enough to lessen punishment.[4]"
            "However, the defense of "Superior Orders" has been used both before  and
after the Nuremberg Trials."
            "The trial of Peter von Hagenbach
            See also: Command  responsibility
Hagenbach on trial, from Berner Chronik des Diebold  Schilling dem Älteren
In 1474, in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach by an ad  hoc tribunal of the
Holy Roman Empire, there was the first known "international"  recognition
of commanders' obligations to act lawfully.[5][6] Hagenbach offered  the
defense that he was just following orders, but this defense was rejected and  he
was convicted of war crimes and beheaded.[7]
            Specifically, Hagenbach was  put on trial for atrocities committed under
his command but not by him directly,  during the occupation of Breisach. This
was the earliest modern European example  of the doctrine of command
responsibility.[7][8] Since he was convicted for  crimes "he as a knight was deemed
to have a duty to prevent," Hagenbach defended  himself by arguing that he
was only following orders[5][9] from the Duke of  Burgundy, Charles the
Bold, to whom the Holy Roman Empire had given  Breisach.[10] This defense was
            "On June 4, 1921, the legal doctrine of "Superior Orders" was used during 
the German Military Trials that took place after World War I: One of the
most  famous of these trials was the matter of Lieutenant Karl Neumann, who was
a  U-Boat Captain responsible for the sinking of the Hospital ship, the
Dover  Castle.[11] Even though he frankly admitted to having sunk the ship, he
stated  that he had done so on the basis of orders supplied to him by the
German  Admiralty; and as such, he could not be held liable for his actions.
The Leipsic  Supreme Court (Germany's Supreme Court) acquitted him, accepting
the defense of  superior orders as a grounds to escape criminal
liability.[12] Further, that  very Court had this to say in the matter of Superior
            "… that all  civilized nations recognize the principle that a subordinate
is covered by the  orders of his superiors.[13]
Many accused of war crimes were acquitted on a  similar defense, creating
immense dissatisfaction amongst the Allies; this has  been thought to be one
of the main causes for the specific removal of this  defense in the London
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which has  been attributed to
the actions of Robert H. Jackson, a Justice of the United  States Supreme
Court, who was appointed Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg  Trials."
            "In 1945 and 1946, during the Nuremberg Trials the issue of Superior Orders
 again arose: These trials gained so much attention that the "Superior
Orders  defense" has subsequently become interchangeable with the label,
"Nuremberg  Defense." This is a legal defense that essentially states that the
defendant was  "only following orders" ("Befehl ist Befehl", literally "order is
order") and is  therefore not responsible for his or her crimes."
            "Before the end of World War II, the Allies suspected such a defense  might
be employed, and issued the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), which specifically stated that following an unlawful order is
 not a valid defense against charges of war crimes.
Thus, under Nuremberg  Principle IV, "defense of superior orders" is not a
defense for war crimes,  although it might influence a sentencing authority
to lessen the penalty.  Nuremberg Principle IV states:
"The fact that a person acted pursuant to  order of his Government or of a
superior does not relieve him from  responsibility under international law,
provided a moral choice was in fact  possible to him."
            During the Nuremberg trials, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Jodl  and other
defendants unsuccessfully used the defense.
            (Before the trials,  there was little consensus amongst the Allies as to
what was to be done with the  Nazi war prisoners. Winston Churchill was
inclined to have the leaders 'executed  as outlaws'.[14] The Soviets desired
trials, but wished there to be a  presumption of guilt, as opposed to the
procedural presumption of innocence that  accompanies most western criminal
            "The defense of "Superior Orders" again arose in the 1961 trial of  Adolf
Eichmann in Israel, as well as the trial of Alfredo Astiz of Argentina, 
responsible for a large number of disappearances and kidnappings that took place
 during that nation's transfer to democracy.
            Following the My Lai Massacre in  1968, the defense was employed during the
court martial of William Calley. Some  have argued that the outcome of the
My Lai Massacre courts martial was a  reversal of the laws of war that were
set forth in the Nuremberg and Tokyo War  Crimes Tribunals.[16] Secretary of
the Army Howard Callaway was quoted in the  New York Times as stating that
Calley's sentence was reduced because Calley  honestly believed that what he
did was a part of his orders — a rationale that  stands in direct
contradiction of the standards set at Nuremberg and Tokyo,  where German and Japanese
soldiers were executed for similar acts.
            In 1996,  the "Superior Orders" defense was successfully used by Erich
Priebke, although  the verdict was appealed and he was later convicted[citation
needed]. It was  used with varying degrees of success by those involved in
the Hostages  Trial[citation needed]."
            "The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
It could  be argued that a version of the Superior Orders defense can be
found as a  defense to international crimes in the Rome Statute of the
International  Criminal Court. (The Rome Statute was agreed upon in 1998 as the
foundational  document of the International Criminal Court, established to try
those  individuals accused of serious international crimes.) Article 33,
titled  "Superior Orders and prescription of law,"[17] states:"


            1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, 
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal 
responsibility unless:
            (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the 
Government or the superior in question;
            (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
            (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.

2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity are manifestly unlawful.


            There are two interpretations of this Article:
            This formulation, especially (1)(a), whilst effectively prohibiting the use
 of the Nuremberg Defense in relation to charges of genocide and crimes
against  humanity, does however, appear to allow the Nuremberg Defense to be
used as a  protection against charges of war crimes, provided the relevant
criteria are  met.
            Nevertheless, this interpretation of ICC Article 33 is open to debate:  For
example Article 33 (1)(c) protects the defendant only if "the order was not
 manifestly unlawful." The "order" could be considered "unlawful" if we
consider  Nuremberg Principle IV to be the applicable "law" in this case. If
so, then the  defendant is not protected. Discussion as to whether or not
Nuremberg Prinicple  IV is the applicable law in this case is found in a
discussion of the Nuremberg  Principles' power or lack of power.
            "Nuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual's 
responsibility, was at issue in Canada in the case of Hinzman v. Canada. Jeremy  Hinzman
was a U.S. Army deserter who claimed refugee status in Canada as a 
conscientious objector, one of many Iraq War resisters. Hinzman's lawyer, (at  that
time Jeffry House), had previously raised the issue of the legality of the 
Iraq War as having a bearing on their case. The Federal Court ruling was 
released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim.[18][19] In
the  decision, Justice Anne L. Mactavish addressed the issue of personal 
            "An individual must be involved at the policy-making level to  be culpable
for a crime against peace ... the ordinary foot soldier is not  expected to
make his or her own personal assessment as to the legality of a  conflict.
Similarly, such an individual cannot be held criminally responsible  for
fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that his or her personal 
war-time conduct is otherwise proper."[18] [20]"
            "On Nov 15, 2007, a quorum of the Supreme Court of Canada made of Justices 
Michel Bastarache, Rosalie Abella, and Louise Charron refused an
application to  have the Court hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.[21] 
            "... in written arguments to the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. House pointed
 out that although our courts have so far refused to grant refugee status
to  Americans soldiers who are deserting military duty out of moral objection
to the  war in Iraq, in 1995 the Federal Court of Appeal granted refugee
status to a  deserter from Saddam Hussein's armed incursion into Kuwait, on
the basis that he  should not be compelled to take part in an illegal war.
            "The courts are taking one stance for Saddam Hussein's soldiers and another
 one entirely for American soldiers," Mr. House said.[23]
See also: Jeremy  Hinzman, Anne L. Mactavish, and Canada and Iraq War
            "In June 2006, during the Iraq War, Ehren Watada refused to go to Iraq on 
account of his belief that the Iraq war was a crime against peace (waging a
war  of aggression for territorial aggrandizement), which he believed could
make him  liable for prosecution under the command responsibility doctrine.
In this case,  the judge ruled that soldiers, in general, are not
responsible for determining  whether the order to go to war itself is a lawful order -
but are only  responsible for those orders resulting in a specific
application of military  force, such as an order to shoot civilians, or to treat
POWs inconsistently with  the Geneva Conventions. This is consistent with the
Nuremberg Defense, as only  the civilian and military principals of the Axis
were charged with crimes  against peace, while subordinate military
officials were not so  charged.[24]
            Based on this principle international law developed the concept  of
individual criminal liability for war crimes which resulted in the current 
doctrine of command responsibility.[25][26][27]"
            "The below overview of history shows a notable lack of consistency in 
rulings on the issue of Superior Orders.
            This is an incomplete list [. . .]
(For overview purposes, the  below table attempts to capsulize much of the
history in the above article. It  is based on references above. To navigate
to those supporting references and  further information for each case, click
on "see details" for each  case.)
            DatePreceding ContextJurisdiction / decisionmakerDefendant(s) or 
case(s)[found] "responsible" despite Superior Orders[found] "not responsible" 
because of Superior Orders


the occupation of Breisachad hoc tribunal of the Holy Roman EmpirePeter von
 Hagenbachyes (see details)


World War IGermany's Supreme Court (trials after World War I)Lieutenant 
Karl Neumann and othersyes (see details)


World War IINuremberg trials after World War IIall defendantsyes (see 


preparation for future casesRome Statute of the International Criminal 
Courtfuture cases under Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Courtpossibly in cases of genocide (see details)possibly in cases
other  than genocide (see details)


Iraq WarJustice Anne L. Mactavish - Federal Court (Canada)Jeremy Hinzman 
(refugee applicant)equivalent to yes* (see details)

"*" Hinzman was not  on trial for something he did in battle. However, if
the principle of this  particular judge's ruling had applied to such a trial,
then Hinzman would have  been found "not responsible" because of Superior
Orders. (see details)"

"Arguments for and against"

            This "Superior Orders" defense is still used with the following  rationale
in the following scenario: An "order" may come from one's superior at  the
level of national law. But according to Nuremberg Principle IV, such an 
order is sometimes "unlawful" according to international law. Such an "unlawful 
order" presents a legal dilemma from which there is no legal escape: On one
 hand, a person who refuses such an unlawful order faces the possibility of
legal  punishment at the national level for refusing orders. On the other
hand, a  person who accepts such an unlawful order faces the possibility of
legal  punishment at the international level (eg. Nuremberg Trials) for
committing  unlawful acts. Therefore this is a Catch-22 legal dilemma.
Nuremberg  Principle II responds to that dilemma by stating: "The fact that
internal law  does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a
crime under  international law does not relieve the person who committed the act
from  responsibility under international law."[28]"
            "The above scenario might present a legal dilemma, but Nuremberg Principle 
IV speaks of "a moral choice" as being just as important as "legal"
decisions:  It states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or  of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under
international law,  provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him"."
            "In "moral choices" or ethical dilemmas an ethical decision is often  made
by appealing to a "higher ethic" such as ethics in religion or secular 
ethics. One such "higher ethic," which is found in many religions and also in 
secular ethics, is the "ethic of reciprocity," or the Golden Rule. It states 
that one has a right to just treatment, and therefore has a reciprocal 
responsibility to ensure justice for others. "Higher ethics," such as those, 
could be used by an individual to solve the legal dilemma presented by the 
"Superior Orders" defense."
            "Another argument against the use of the "Superior Orders" defense (ie.  "I
was just following orders") is that it does not follow the traditional
legal  definitions and categories established under criminal law. Under criminal
law, a  principal is any actor who is primarily responsible for a criminal
offense.[29]  Such an actor is distinguished from others who may also be
subject to criminal  liability as accomplices, accessories or conspirators."
            "Nuremberg Principle IV, the international law which counters the  Superior
Orders defense, is legally supported by the jurisprudence found in  certain
articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which deal 
indirectly with conscientious objection. It is also supported by the principles 
found in paragraph 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status which was issued by the Office of the United Nations  High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Those principles deal with the 
conditions under which conscientious objectors can apply for refugee status in 
another country if they face persecution in their own country for refusing to 
participate in an illegal war."
            In popular culture
            "In the Christopher Buckley novel Thank You for Smoking and its film 
adaptation, the main character Nick Naylor justifies his career to a reporter by 
telling her that "Everybody has a mortgage to pay," and referring to his 
response as the "Yuppie Nuremberg Defense."
            "The play and film A Few Good Men revolves around the question of the 
culpability of officers giving orders which they knew to be illegal, and the 
culpability of the soldiers under their command for following such orders,
when  such orders resulted in unintended and unforeseen consequences."

"See also
Command responsibility
Milgram Experiment
Nuremberg  Principle IV
Nuremberg Principles
Peter von Hagenbach
Respondeat  superior
Vicarious liability"

^ See L.C. Green, Superior  Orders in National and International Law, (A.W.
Sijthoff International  Publishing Co., Netherlands, 1976)
^ See Harvard Law Review Editorial Board,  The Doctrine of Respondeat
Superior, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1. pp.  51-2, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 51
(Nov., 1903).
^ See James B. Insco, Defense of  Superior Orders Before Military
Commissions, Duke Journal of Comparative and  International Law, 13 DUKEJCIL 389
(Spring, 2003). Asserting in the author's  view that a respondeat superior
approach to superior orders is an  "underinclusive extreme."
^ H.T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, Case  Western Journal of
International Law, Vol. 34. (Fall 2002) at pg. 335.e
^ a b  The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under
international law By  Edoardo Greppi, Associate Professor of International Law at the
University of  Turin, Italy, International Committee of the Red Cross No.
835, p. 531-553,  October 30, 1999.
^ Exhibit highlights the first international war crimes  tribunal by Linda
Grant, Harvard Law Bulletin.
^ a b An Introduction to the  International Criminal Court William A.
Schabas, Cambridge University Press,  Third Edition
^ Command Responsibility The Mens Rea Requirement, By Eugenia  Levine,
Global Policy Forum, February 2005
^ Judge and master By Don Murray,  CBC News, July 18, 2002.
^ The Perennial Conflict Between International  Criminal Justice and
Realpolitik February 10, 2006 Draft by M. Cherif Bassiouni  -Distinguished
Research Professor of Law and President, International Human  Rights Law Institute,
DePaul University College of Law, To be Presented March  14, 2006 as the
38th Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture, Georgia State  University College
of Law, and to appear in the Georgia State University Law  Review
^ New York Times (June 5, 1921). "FREE MAN WHO SANK A HOSPITAL SHIP; 
Leipsic Judges Acquit Neumann on the Ground That He Acted Under Orders. HE 
ADMITTED TORPEDOING Prosecutor Demanded Acquittal, Calling Dover Castle Culpable 
in Carrying Wounded Soldiers.". New York Times. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C04EEDA1739E133A25756C0A9609C946095D6CF.  Retrieved 10
April 2010.
^ Anon., "German War Trials: Judgement in Case of  Commander Karl Neumann"
, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No.  4. (Oct., 1922)
at pg. 704-708.
^ G.A. Finch, Superior Orders and War Crimes,  The American Journal of
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^ "Churchill: execute Hitler without trial". The Times (Times  Newspapers
Limited). 2006-01-01. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article784041.ece. Retrieved  2008-02-08.
^ K.C. Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime  Trials,
(Greenwood Publishers, 2006), sourced from Google Books.
^ Marshall,  Burke; Goldstein, Joseph (2 April 1976). "Learning From My
Lai: A Proposal on  War Crimes". The New York Times. p. 26.
^ Rome Statute of the International  Criminal Court (10 November 1998 and
12 July 1999). "Rome Statute of the  International Criminal Court; Part 3:
General Principles of Criminal Law;  Article 33: Superior orders and
prescription of law". Rome Statute of the  International Criminal Court. 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm. Retrieved 21 March 2010. 
^ a b Mernagh, M. (2006-05-18). "AWOL GIs Dealt Legal Blow". Toronto's Now 
http://www.nowtoronto.com/news/story.cfm?content=153504&archive=25,38,2006.  Retrieved 2008-06-02.
^ "Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and  Immigration) (F.C.),
2006 FC 420". Office of the Commisioner for Federal  Judicial Affairs. pp. (see
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http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc420/2006fc420.html. Retrieved  2008-06-16.
^ Hinzman v. Canada Federal Court decision. Paras (157) and  (158).
Accessed 2008-06-18
^ CBC News (2007-11-15). "Top court refuses to  hear cases of U.S.
deserters". CBC News. 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/11/15/hinzman-decision.html. Retrieved  2008-06-02.
^ "Supreme Court of Canada - Decisions - Bulletin of November  16, 2007,
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^ Hill, Lawrence (November 24, 2007). "Just desertions". Ottawa Citizen. 
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^ Soldier's Iraq war stance backed: Watada has  right to refuse to go,
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^ Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command  Responsibility,
and the Development of International Criminal Law HTML version  by Allison
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ews Online, May  6, 2004
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^ See, e.g.,  Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 177-78; United States v. Campa,
679 F.2d 1006,  1013 (lst Cir. 1982).

External link
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