Britain not going to bomb Syria "for now"

Ian Morris’s title is Why the West Rules – For Now and not why the British or U.S. rules.  Nevertheless the Parliamentary debate over whether to bomb Assad’s Syria for using Chemical Weapons, at least the part I watched, seemed to pertain to unilateral action on the part of Britain.  Britain had the power to bomb Syria; it had the fourth largest military force in the world according to Cameron and could punish Syria for using WMDs if it chose to.  In the end, Parliament didn’t support that bombing and Cameron said that he would abide by Parliament’s decision.

Also interesting were the comments of Lord Ashdown who called himself an “old warhorse,” but only in the sense of wanting to back the U.S. as it chastised Syria. 

In this morning’s (Riverside) Press Enterprise Victor Davis Hanson opposed Western intervention in Syria for reasons of Western interest: “In terms of realpolitik, anti-Israeli Authoritarians are fighting to the death against anti-Israeli insurgents and terrorists.  Each is doing more damage to the other than Israel ever could – and in an unprecedented, grotesque fashion.  Who now is gassing Arab innocents?  Shooting Arab civilians in the streets?  Rounding up and executing Arab civilians?  Blowing up Arab houses? Answer: Either Arab dictators or radical Islamists.” 

In my opinion, Hanson is right.  It is in the best interest of Israel, the U.S. and Britain to let things play themselves out in Syria without Western interference.  Maybe Assad crossed Obama’s “red line” in regard to Chemical Weapons, but so what?  If we oppose him too strongly that could favor the Islamists and we know what they stand for.  Of course no one in Parliament or the Obama administration is thinking in those terms: a Liberal Administration by definition wouldn’t.  Such an administration prefers to act on “Humanitarian principle.”   Jimmy Carter acted on “Humanitarian principle” when he opposed the Shah.  And when the US withdrew its support of the Shah, or at least caused the Shah to no longer think he had US support, Khomeini was able to take over and institute the Islamist regime which became the greatest threat to the West in modern times.  Do we really want to do that same thing in Syria?

Of course I am getting off track here by discussing what ought to be done by the West rather than the fact that these decisions are even in the hands of the West, whether Britain or the US.  Britain “rules” some of the time, as the nation who has the fourth largest military force in the world might well do (in Morris & Ferguson terms), but it “rules” as an ally of its former colony who now has the largest military force in the world.  Both these “rules” might seem somewhat shaky at the present time: they were expensively exercised in Iraq and Afghanistan, and soldiers and tax payers are weary – “for now.” 

This doesn’t in any way represent a decline in Western power in my opinion.  If in regard to some future problem Western interests are more clearly at stake, then these two military powers, the US & Britain, will still be capable of acting decisively.  But such acts will more closely fit Huntington’s paradigm than they will Morris’s & Ferguson’s.  Ruling the waves is much more expensive and difficult than it used to be.

Krauthammer may agree with Ian Morris

I got off to a rocky start reading Ian Morris’ Why the West Rules – For Now.  I have in the past argued that the only two plausible paradigms for the future were described in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, and Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations.  Morris who seems to know nothing of either book takes a different, and perhaps trivial, position.  I haven’t read very far in his book but far enough to know that he means something by “rules” and it isn’t what Fukuyama and Huntington mean.

On the other hand, perhaps I am trying to make more of what Morris is saying than he intends.  Perhaps he has no interest in a paradigm for the future but is merely looking at the realpolitik of what exists now and how it might change in the not-too-distant future, and perhaps he means what Krauthammer means.  In this morning’s The Press Enterprise is an article by Charles Krauthammer entitled “’Republican crackup’ doesn’t quit hew to media script.”  In it he describes the “natural tension” that has resurfaced between isolationists and internationalists.  He writes “The Paulites, pining for the splendid isolation of the 19^th century, want to leave the world alone on the assumption that it will then leave us alone.

“Which rests on the further assumption that international stability – open sea lanes, free commerce, relative tranquility – comes naturally, like the air we breathe.  If only that were true.  Unfortunately, stability is not a matter of grace.   It comes about only by Great Power exertion.  In the 19^th century, that meant the British navy, behind whose protection America thrived.  Today, world order is maintained by American power and American will.  Take that away and you don’t get tranquility.  You get chaos.”

Krauthammer, and I suspect Morris, probably disagree with both Fukuyama and Huntington.  Fukuyama on these matters would perhaps argue along the lines of, “no you don’t get chaos if American power is withdrawn because the economic interests of each nation will prevail.  It is in each nation’s interest to reach agreements with its trading partners.  Wars inhibit these agreements.  Ultimately all nations will realize this.  We are undergoing a lot of trial and error, but “the end of history” in which all nations are Liberal and Democratic is inevitable.”

Huntington would, perhaps, say that since each Civilization has a “Core Nation,” a nation that steps in when member nations get into trouble, it isn’t necessary that the world itself has a “core nation,” but if it does that any particular “core nation” is required. The various “core nations” will make sure that the world doesn’t degenerate into chaos. 

At present the U.S. is the “core nation” for Western Civilization.  China is the “core nation” for the Sinic Civilization.  If Iran, for example, closed the Straits of Hormuz and the U.S. had an Isolationist President, China would have to step in to open those straits up.  In this case we would see that if the U.S. wasn’t willing to counter Iran’s “chaos producing” act, China or some other core nation would probably do it.  But we also see that the core nations are largely in agreement as to what has to occur.  Krauthammer’s assessment that the world will descend into chaos if the U.S. abandons its role as “world policeman” doesn’t work well with Huntington’s more-carefully-thought-out paradigm.

Ian Morris is a Professor in Classics and History at Stanford University.  Samuel P. Huntington (died in 2008) was, and Francis Fukuyama is a Political Scientist.  I am probably treating Morris unfairly at this point and should have read further before saying anything about his book.  After all the subtitle of his book is “The Patterns of History, and what they reveal about the future.”  If only his main title hadn’t been Why the West Rules – for Now.

Attacking Iran -- moral implications

My first note presented some controversies but didn’t take sides in order to imagine a time when all has been resolved, much as Fukuyama says that one day it will be.

Perhaps it would be helpful to consider both why we ought to attack Iran and why we should not. Matthew Kroenig argues (all the while considering the alternatives) that we should. Kroenig’s article, “Time to Attack Iran, Why a Strike is the least bad option” appears in the January/February 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs. Matthew Kroenig is “Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. From July 2010 to July 2011, he was Special Adviser in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, responsible for defense strategy and policy on Iran.”

While you can’t read Kroenig’s article online, you can read opposing responses to it on the Foreign Affairs web site, e.g., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137036/alexandre-debs-and-nuno-p-monteiro/the-flawed-logic-of-striking-iran

The controversy bears a resemblance to war vs. antiwar arguments prior to World War Two. Certain French Generals can in retrospect be seen to have gotten it right. France should have poured more money into defense. French leaders were arguing that France couldn’t afford to, just as there are those today arguing that we can’t afford to do anything about Iran. But in retrospect, if we go a short way up the mountain, we can look back at the cost to France and say without fear of disagreement, that the cost would have been far less to France if they had beefed up their military and dealt with Hitler in the early days of his violations of Germany’s post-WWI agreements. But France dithered as Hitler became stronger and stronger.

We in the U.S. are going to do one thing or the other. We are going to attack Iran or we are not, and we cannot know in advance which option will be the least expensive. Yes, we can say with the pre-WWII French leaders, the cost of arms is expensive, but will we after our opponent (in this case Iran) does whatever it is going to do, decide that we have made the right decision, and are taking all possible expenses into consideration? In France’s case it is clear that they did not make the right decision. If we do nothing will we have to say the same thing later on? Or will a new, mini-cold war, seem preferable and indeed have its benefits?

If we do nothing, as Kroenig argues, and Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia is sure to want them as well. We are going to have to step up and either dole them out to Saudi Arabia and our other Middle-Eastern allies, or promise we will guard such states with permanently deployed ship-board and airborne nuclear weapons. It might in the long run cost far more to keep a fleet permanently in the region than it would be to knock out all or most of Iran’s nuclear capability in a single strike.

Do we have moral arguments for a preemptive strike against Iran? Iranian leaders have threatened Israel and Britain. Are these and similar threats sufficient to warrant a preemptive strike from a moral standpoint? A case can certainly be made. Iran engages in human-rights violations. Such violations are intrinsic to Islamic Fundamentalism. Iran is guilty of intolerance against non-Islamic religions and has vowed to destroy both Christianity and Judaism, especially the latter. Hitler voiced similar threats in his Mein Kampf, but they were discounted as meaningless bluster until he actually carried them out. Are we justified (or more importantly is Israel justified) in discounting the words of Ahmadinejad?

There will be many in the military who realize that more money will be pumped into weaponry and maintenance if we do not strike Iran preemptively and Iran is allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. A preemptive strike would use a minimum amount of weaponry during a limited time. But if we do not strike Iran preemptively and have instead to guard the region indefinitely with our war ships and planes, the Navy and Air Force will be assured of ongoing congressional support for new weaponry and military forces indefinitely.

In our Liberal Democracy there are many agendas besides the moral one that we might consider. And one can by no means assume that the current democratic president will be less likely to conduct a preemptive strike against Iran the Republican he defeated. One can imagine Obama’s advisors weighing the options and telling him that the voting public isn’t going to want to unseat him if he is in the midst of a military action – a strike against Iran at the right time might be the surest path to reelection.

Hermann Hesse, Iran, and the future

On page 50 of Consciousness and Society, The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930, H. Stuart Hughes writes, “. . . despite the seriousness of their scholarship and the dignity of their personal situation, the German professors were the prisoners of their own exalted station. The public treated them with a respect and followed their abstract debates with a passionate interest that may strike us as a little short of miraculous, but, like most of the state government that employed them, it expected of its professors a thoroughly conformist attitude toward the national community. And the professors were not too loath to conform: some of them might criticize with violence the internal character of the regime, but in the realm of foreign policy virtually all remained within the nationalist frame. . . .”

In earlier times there were ample examples of Barons opposing Kings, but those working on a Baron’s land could not hope to oppose the Baron with equal impunity. It isn’t until we move forward into the era of Democracy that such an act becomes practical, that is, that a person can oppose their nation’s foreign policy and expect not to end up in jail or worse. Germany in the time-period Hughes is interested in wasn’t there yet. Hermann Hesse was “there” as an individual. He supported the war effort at the beginning of World War One, but nevertheless in 1914 wrote an essay entitled "O Friends, Not These Tones" ("O Freunde, nicht diese Töne") urging a recognition of Europe’s common heritage. Hughes describes Hesse as moving to Switzerland because he was disgusted by the growing militarism.”

We can assume along with Hughes that the militarism of Germany in the two World Wars was unjustifiable, but we cannot build a principle from that and apply it to all nations. France as we know was not nearly as militaristic during this period. We can read about France in Roger Shattuck’s The Banquet Years. It was deeply influenced by anarchistic and pacifistic arguments. While it was right for Hesse to oppose Germany’s militarism, the pacifists and anarchists who opposed French militarism were (and I suspect few would disagree with me here) wrong. Had the French been supporting their military at the time the German’s were building theirs, World War II could, many historians argue, have been nipped in the bud, that is, reduced to a minor altercation.

At this point I propose a simplistic principle: It is good to support just wars but not good to support unjust wars. I assume here the rejection of the pacifistic argument. Few who lived through the conclusions of that argument during the Vichy period in France would wish to live it again.

A more serious objection to this principle has to do with its definition: How do we go about distinguishing just wars from unjust wars? If we are heirs of the Enlightenment we can argue that wars for humanistic and “enlightened” reasons are more likely to be just than those which are not. But some consider themselves “heirs” and take a Marxist viewpoint. Others reject the Enlightenment and think all points of view equal. Therefore these latter argue, the tyrannies of Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il must not be opposed militarily because all regimes, all governments, all people are equal.

In this, as in struggles of the past, the victor will get to write the histories. If Francis Fukuyama is correct and Liberal Democracy comprises the end of history then none of the objections from Socialists, anarchists, Islamists, Revolutionaries or any other political viewpoint will stand against it in the long run.

Moving up the mountain and standing above it all, if Fukuyama is proved right and every form of government opposing Liberal democracy is eventually converted; then in looking back at the various wars we fought or are about to fight, the arguments may hinge on whether it was better to fight a war or let matters play themselves out. We haven’t fought a war with Iran yet; so is it better for Liberal Democracies to fight against Iran and prevent them from using nuclear weapons, or is it better to let them have their weapons because in the long run they will become a Liberal Democracy and it won’t really matter what they do now? Think of Vietnam for comparison. Millions were killed during the war so those opposing the war could later say “I told you so.” But Millions of people were killed by the Communists after the war so those favoring the war could say “I told you so.” Since then Vietnam has been slowly mellowing. The day may come when historians write that nothing that went on during that war really mattered in the long run. Will it be possible to one day say that about Iran?

A difference between Vietnam and Iran is that the former admired Communism, a political philosophy that has been discredited in almost everyone’s eyes; while the latter is devoted to Shia Islam which is not likely to become discredited in a comparable way. Shia Islam has fought against Sunni Islam for hundreds of years. Perhaps they will fight against Liberal Democracy for as long? At the end of those hundreds of years (we are still sitting on our mountain) we may argue that we should have had a war in 2012 to deny them nuclear weapons. But if we do have that war, it may be (from our mountain perch) that some argue that it took a few hundred years longer but in the end Iran was just like Vietnam.

Netanyahu, speaking at UN about Iran

In response to my note “The Bombing of Iran – hypothetical considerations” (http://www.lawrencehelm.com/2009/09/bombing-of-iran-hypothetical.html ) a reader asked if I had read Netanyahu’s speech at the UN General Assembly. It is a sad thing to read. On the one hand Netanyahu is fearless and vehement in what he says. On the other hand, why should he have to say things like this in 2009? The bulk of the U.N. seems to be where Hitler and the Nazis were in the 40s.

The Netanyahu speech can be found at http://mwcnews.net/content/view/33366/42. In it Netanyahu says, “. . . if the most primitive fanaticism can acquire the most deadly weapons, the march of history could be reversed for a time. And like the belated victory over the Nazis, the forces of progress and freedom will prevail only after an horrific toll of blood and fortune has been exacted from mankind. That is why the greatest threat facing the world today is the marriage between religious fanaticism and the weapons of mass destruction.

The most urgent challenge facing this body is to prevent the tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Are the member states of the United Nations up to that challenge? Will the international community confront a despotism that terrorizes its own people as they bravely stand up for freedom?

Will it take action against the dictators who stole an election in broad daylight and gunned down Iranian protesters who died in the streets choking in their own blood? Will the international community thwart the world's most pernicious sponsors and practitioners of terrorism?

Above all, will the international community stop the terrorist regime of Iran from developing atomic weapons, thereby endangering the peace of the entire world?

The people of Iran are courageously standing up to this regime. People of goodwill around the world stand with them, as do the thousands who have been protesting outside this hall. Will the United Nations stand by their side?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The jury is still out on the United Nations, and recent signs are not encouraging. . . .”

COMMENT:

Reading this speech, and especially the portion I quote above, and applying it to the matter of whether Israel truly expects diplomatic efforts to turn Iran from their nuclear ambitions, I would have to conclude that Netanyahu does indeed intend to wait and see, but it is apparent that he is not optimistic. For Netanyahu and Israel “the Jury is still out on the United Nations.”

In another portion of the speech, Netanyahu apparently to show the deficiencies of the UN how in Palestine “. . . after eight years of this unremitting assault, Israel was finally forced to respond. But how should we have responded? Well, there is only one example in history of thousands of rockets being fired on a country's civilian population. It happened when the Nazis rocketed British cities during World War II. During that war, the allies leveled German cities, causing hundreds of thousands of casualties. Israel chose to respond differently. Faced with an enemy committing a double war crime of firing on civilians while hiding behind civilians ? Israel sought to conduct surgical strikes against the rocket launchers.”

He goes on to describe how Israel used the utmost care in conducting surgical strikes and yet though the UN gave the 8 years of Palestinian bombing a free pass, they did not do that to Israel’s response. The logic of Netanyahu’s speech doesn’t permit us to apply this lesson of Gaza to what Netanyahu might intend to do to Iran, and yet this has been a topic on the minds of many. What will Israel do if Iran intends to do something like the Nazis did against London? Is it a mere coincidence that he describes what Israel did in response to being bombed from Palestine? Or should we view it as fair warning to Iran?

The bombing of Iran -- hypothetical considerations

http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLT558247

The above article, written by Dan Williams for Reuters is entitled “Analysis – Israel rethinks anti-Iran warnings.”

A while back I posted a note arguing that Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear facilities if US negotiations with Iran failed. Have I already been proved wrong? I’ll quote a few passages from the Williams article and comment below.

“. . . Suddenly, the Iranian "existential threat" seems to have receded from Israel's horizon.

“It began with a bombshell Sept 18 newspaper interview in which Defence Minister Ehud Barak asserted that a nuclear-armed Iran could not destroy the Jewish state. Similar public remarks followed from the general in charge of all military operations.

“Even hawkish Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman now sounds skittish about his government's long hinted-at willingness to go to war rather than see an enemy get the means to make a bomb.

“’God forbid -- there's no need to attack anything,’ he told Israel's Channel Two television on Monday.

“While Israeli officials insist that ‘all’ options remain available for tackling their arch-foe, few dispute that Barak -- the top strategist, alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- has taken a new rhetorical tack as major world powers prepare to revive negotiations with Tehran on Thursday . . .

“Short on the forces necessary to deliver permanent damage to Iranian nuclear sites, the Israelis hope the new talks will work, one official said -- or, failing that, eventually trigger U.S.-led military intervention. ‘The last thing we need to do right now is to distract from the diplomacy with the kind of threats that Iran can point to as 'proof' that they, not us, are the endangered party,’ the Israeli official said. . . .”

“A unilateral Israeli attack could draw reprisals on U.S. Gulf assets, further testing already strained ties between Netanyahu and President Barack Obama. Should Iran cut off oil exports, Israel may find itself blamed for a new global crisis. . . .”

"The idea that Israel can do the world's dirty work is under serious review. Sufficient follow-up support just isn't there."

“. . . Barak said that Israel . . . could deter or fend off any future attack by a nuclear-armed Iran.

"’I don't think we are on the brink of a new Holocaust,’ he said, clashing openly with Netanyahu's repeated likening of today's Iran to Nazi Germany on the eve of World War Two.

“. . . Netanyahu said he saw ‘eye to eye’ with Barak. The Prime Minister's Office denied that there had been any change to Israeli strategising on Iran. . . .”

As defence minister to Netanyahu's predecessor, Ehud Olmert, Barak was cautious on warmaking. According to a security cabinet official at the time, Barak argued against the 2007 sortie that destroyed an alleged Syrian atomic reactor, calling it hasty. Barak's aides denied that, and the fact that the air strike happened points, at the very least, to his ability to close rank. . . .”

“Iran is dead set against recognising the Jewish state and has numerous, distant, fortified and -- in the case of an uranium enrichment plant disclosed last week -- hidden nuclear facilities.

"Barak's thinking on Iran definitely appears to have sway, for now," said an Israeli security official who is not aligned with the Defence Ministry. . . .”

COMMENT:

If we assume, for purposes of discussion, that Iran has deadly intentions toward Israel and has a nuclear armed missile, where in Iran would they launch it? If you look at a map, the shortest distance from Iran to Israel is over Iraq. Would Iran risk retaliation from the US by sending its missiles over American’s ally, Iraq? Perhaps not. If they move their launching site far enough north to avoid flying over Iraq, they would have to send it over Turkey, Syria, and perhaps Lebanon or Jordan to get to Israel.

If they move their launching site far enough south to avoid sending it over Iraq, they will have to send it over Saudi Arabia and Jordan to reach Israel. Saudi Arabia has been a traditional enemy of Iran. Could Iran negotiate a deal with the Saudis and Jordan to destroy their mutual enemy, Israel? Perhaps, but if the Saudis and Jordan did, they would risk antagonizing the US. Would they risk that?

But perhaps Ahmadinejad will argue that he has looked into Obama’s eyes, and Obama blinked, convincing him that the US will NOT retaliate if Iran sends its missiles over Iraq.

So even after Iran gets its nuclear weapon and a missile to transport it, launching it in the direction of Israel is not without its problems. And one mustn’t forget that many of North Korea’s test launches fell far short of their intended targets. Would Saudi Arabia or Iraq feel so confident in Iran’s technological capability that they would have no concern that a missile launched toward Israel not fall short and hit Saudi Arabia or Iraq?

But how does Israel view all these possibilities and have they truly taken their threat of bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities off the table? If I were in charge of defending Israel, I would not take too much comfort in Iran’s over-flight difficulties. All the nations under discussion are more or less enemies of Israel.

Notice also that by seeming to back away from its Anti-Iran threat, Israel is doing its part in assisting the diplomatic process. Let the diplomacy be entirely about Iran’s nuclear weapons and not about an impending threat from Israel. Let Iran be seen as the belligerent nation and not Israel.

Also for the sake of discussion, let’s assume that diplomacy with Iran fails, and Iran continues developing nuclear weapons. If Israel then decided to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities, all the over-flight problems discussed above would have to be dealt with by Israel. So how would they do it?

One way would be to fly over Saudi Arabia and assume the Saudis would not retaliate; which would probably be a safe assumption. They would certainly complain, but probably not retaliate. Could the Israelis fly over Saudi Arabia without Iran getting wind of it in advance? I don’t know.

Sending a force down the Red Sea and around the Saudi Arabian Peninsula is another possibility, but that might be even harder to do without being observed.

Another possibility would be to cross Syrian airspace. They could then cut across the semi-independent Kurdish territory. The Kurds are not fond of the Iranians and might very well be encouraged to look the other way.

FURTHER COMMENTS:

Would Israel be justified in bombing Iran? Assume that you are in charge of a nation (Israel) and if another nation (Iran) expresses maniacal hatred towards you, threatens to destroy you and begins building a weapon to do just that, will you choose to let it happen or will you choose to destroy that weapon before it can be used against you?

There are other possibilities of course, you might against all existing evidence “hope for the best.” Surely, you might hope, no nation would deliberately destroy your entire nation. Against that you might recall that in the middle of the twentieth century, a group (German Fascists) with quite a lot in common with the political elements of Radical Islam attempted to do the equivalent of that and made considerable progress.

You might also hope you could rely on your ally, the US, to protect you against Iran (there is a hint of that in the Williams article), but some American administrations have failed you in the past. The Obama administration might be another. Are you willing to risk Israel’s existence on the assumption that it is not?

You might also think that no rational human being would bomb Israel out of existence, but do you really think that Ahmadinejad meets that description?

CONCLUSION:

Does the Dan Williams article provide any reason to retract my argument that Israel will attack Iran if negotiations (to get them to stop building nuclear weapons) fails? Iran hasn’t withdrawn its threat against Israel. It is still (according to supposedly reputable intelligence reports) building its nuclear weapons. In fact the British think Iran is very close to completing these weapons (see http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/837f30a0-ad30-11de-9caf-00144feabdc0.html ). So, no, I don’t believe that anything in the Williams article is cause to change my opinion. If the US did the job then Israel wouldn’t have to, but I don’t think the present American administration has the stomach for something like that.

Israel will attack Iran if US diplomacy fails

http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/full_edition.php?Edition=8/14/2009

The following sub-article appears in the above Global Security Newswire, dated 8-14-2009:

Israel Could Slow Iranian Nuclear-Weapon Drive, Official Says

Friday, Aug. 14, 2009

An Israeli attack could set back Iran's nuclear-weapon development efforts, a security official in Jerusalem told the newspaper Maariv in remarks published yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 13).

Iran is working to conceal its nuclear work and bolster its ability to retaliate against attacks, giving Israel a limited window of opportunity to launch an effective strike, United Press International quoted the official as saying.

Israel, the United States and some European countries have expressed concern that Iranian uranium enrichment activities could support nuclear weapons development, but Tehran has maintained that its atomic ambitions are strictly peaceful.

The Israeli official suggested his nation would not wait for the OK from Washington before launching a strike. Still, Israel should let U.S. diplomatic overtures to Tehran play out before considering an attack, according to Maariv.

Since taking office in January, the Obama administration has encouraged Iran to join renewed multilateral discussions aimed at halting its uranium enrichment program. To date, Tehran has expressed little interest in joining such talks. Washington has suggested that it could pursue new sanctions against Iran should it fail to agree to additional discussions by next month (United Press International, Aug. 13).

COMMENT:

Anyone reading about correspondence between Japan and the U.S. leading up to and including World War II will be amazed at how often the two nations misunderstood each other. Major decisions were made costing thousands of lives, based upon misunderstandings. The same state of affairs exists today between Middle-Eastern nations and Western nations. It is an historical fact, for example, that Saddam Hussein utterly misunderstood America’s position – during the administrations of both Bush 41 & Bush 43.

And today, Iran may or may not be misunderstanding the Obama administration, but it has no logical reason for misunderstanding Israel’s position. Middle-Eastern nations have attacked Israel several times. Who can keep track of the times Israel has been attacked. So it should tax no one’s imagination, not even the imagination of an Iranian, to suspect that Israel is paranoid about being attacked.

What does Israel do when it fears immanent attack? If possible it preempts the attack. What about the preparation of nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern nation, bearing in mind that Israel is so small even a near miss might wipe out half the nation? We needn’t wonder. We have an historical incident. Saddam Hussein amidst threats of what he was going to do to Israel (threats reminiscent of those issued by Ahmadinejad) began the development of nuclear weapons. Read what Wikipedia has to say about the Israeli attack on Saddam’s nuclear reactor:

“In the late 1970s, Iraq purchased an "Osiris class" nuclear reactor from France. Israeli military intelligence assumed this was for the purpose of plutonium production to further an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Israeli intelligence also believed that the summer of 1981 would be the last chance to destroy the reactor before it would be loaded with nuclear fuel.”

Now notice the similarity of the language: The Wikipedia article says “Israeli intelligence . . . believed that the summer of 1981 would be the last chance to destroy the reactor before it would be loaded with nuclear fuel.” The Global Security News wire article says, “. . . Iran is working to conceal its nuclear work . . . giving Israel a limited window of opportunity to launch an effective strike . . .”

Iran should realize that Israel is paranoid about being attacked. It should also know that Israel will make use of the “window” available to it for destroying nuclear weapons of those swearing to attack them.

It may seem from the Global Security Network article that I took some liberties with my title. A strict reading of that article should have caused me to entitle this post “Israel may attack Iran if US diplomacy fails.” But I have merely drawn the logical conclusion based upon the evidence at hand. “Israel will attack Iran if US diplomacy fails.” Shall we not fault Iranian officials if they are not capable of drawing the same conclusion?

Iran's Khomeini Was a Russophile

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/04/window-on-eurasia-irans-khomeini-was.html

The above was posted by Paul Goble on his blog April 1st. It is entitled, “Iran’s Khomeini Was a Russophile, KGB Resident in Tehran Says.”

“Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution whose regime was formally inaugurated 30 years ago today, was a committed Russophile, according to the retired KGB officer who served as that organization’s resident in Tehran before and during that time.”

” Leonid Shebarshin, who retired from the Soviet intelligence service as a much-decorated lieutenant general and who now heads his own company, talks about his years of service in Iran, 1979-1983 (www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2009.278.articles.conception_01 ).”

“In May 1979, just before he departed for Tehran, Shebarshin says that he was told by KGB chief and future CPSU leader Yury Andropov that ‘left progressive forces [in Iran] had no chance of coming to power and that many years would be required for Iranians to become disappointed in the theocracy.’

“. . . Shebarshin describes what he says were the “intelligent and pragmatic” qualities of the Iranian leaders who maintained their economic relations with the Soviet Union and did not force out most Soviet workers in the country, although Tehran did force all Americans and most Europeans to do so. . . .”

“At the end of December 1979, after Moscow had sent its forces into Afghanistan, the Soviet ambassador in Tehran travelled to Khomeini’s residence in Qum to explain why Moscow had taken the decision to intervene and to discuss the possible consequences of that action for Soviet-Iranian relations. ‘The imam attentively listened to [the Soviet diplomat] and then said: “You are making a big error!” And in general, [the Iranian leader] turned out to be right,’ Shebarshin acknowledges. But then the former KGB officer makes the following declaration: ‘Imam Khomeini was a Russophile, however strange this may seem’ to those who do not know the history of Iran.

“’Of course, the ayatollah was “an opponent of godless socialism, but [he was also] a man who had great respect for northern neighbor and belonged to an [Iranian] Russophile family. “At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century,” Shebarshin explains, “Iranian society was approximately equally divided between Anglophiles and Russophiles.”

“And it turned out that “already his upbringing in childhood and youth led Ruholla al-Musavi al-Khomini to relate to Russia with respect,” a background Moscow and its KGB clearly recognized, valued, and exploited but one that many people elsewhere not only did not know but considered absolutely impossible.’”

COMMENT:

It was possible to know something of what Shebarshin knew about Khomeini based on a different line of reasoning. Khomeini loved Stalinist tactics. The same thing can be said about Sayyid Qutb who was the Islamist philosopher of the Sunnis. They both loved the way Stalin operated. We know that during the Second world war, there was a lot of fondness for the Nazis because of their hatred of the Jews and Sayyid Qutb, at least, seemed to take from both the Nazis and the Stalinists in formulating his Islamist ideology.

Knowing that the Islamists owed a great deal to Soviet tactics, both domestic and foreign, did I take the next step and assume that meant that Khomeini liked Russians? No, I didn’t know that. I knew more about Sayyid Qutb than I did Khomeini and Sayyid Qutb’s liking of Soviet tactics while sitting in an Egyptian jail was a disembodied sort of thing. He never had a chance to put his ideas into practice or to show a preference for a non-Islamic people. And yet he and his followers did have a great respect for the Soviets. That is without doubt. Osama bin Laden believed he was fighting against the greatest enemy of Islam when he fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan; such that when the Soviets left in defeat he thought that nothing could stop the relentless role of Islam as it conquered the rest of the world. He thought the US would be easier to defeat than the USSR. He defeated (according to him) the USSR in Afghanistan and expected to defeat the US in Iraq.

Now I wonder about something else. If much of Iranian society was Russophile, what of the many Islamic nations on both sides of present-day-Russia’s borders? Looking at a map I would think Russia had great cause to be worried about Islamism, but perhaps the nations that seem ripe for Islamist picking are also Russophile. But if so, we must ask, does Russophilia trump Islamism?

More on the Iranian Threat

Mack,

To suggest that Iran’s belligerence is a function of something George Bush did is to dismiss the history of Militant Iranian Islamism. This belligerence is a function of their ideology. They are ideologically opposed to infidels and to Muslims who don’t share their Militant Fundamentalism. Also, Iran has supported a number of terrorist attacks against us over the years, attacks which we largely ignored. Ignoring such attacks during the Carter, Reagan and GHW Bush administrations comprised the appeasement which has exacerbated the difficulty of our current task. Had we given evidence of having a big stick during those earlier administrations things might be a bit smoother today. For example, Mahmud Ahmadinejad might be willing to listen to us today rather than contemptuously dismissing us.

Read Robin Wright on Iran’s modern history: In the Name of God, The Khomeini Decade; and The Last Great Revolution, Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. I also found Mohammad Mohaddessin’s Islamic Fundamentalism, the New Global Threat very interesting. After the fall of the Shah there was about a year before Khomeini took charge. The party that was Khomeini’s greatest rival during that period was the one Mohaddessin belonged to, the People’s Mojahedin Organization. Mohaddessin had to flee Iran when Komeini’s supporters began rounding these people up and executing them. Mohadessin is still active. He is Charman of chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran: http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/5556/1/ .

By the way, Khomeini was actively trying to “export” the Iranian revolution long before Bush took up the exportation of democracy.

Ilan Berman is adjunct professor of international law and global security at the National Defense University in Washington DC. His book Tehran Rising, Iran’s Challenge to the United States discusses the growing Iranian belligerence and its causes. It clearly grew out of the Khomeini revolution and was well established long before GW Bush took office.

Lawrence Helm

Dealing with Iran, Plan B

In the late 1950s China was where Iran is today, working on developing nuclear weapons. Bevin Alexander (p. 158 of How America Got it Right) writes that [Kennedy] failed to take advantage of the great schism between China and Russia revealed in the late 1950s. This fracture proved beyond all doubt that Communist states acted in their own interests, not to further some universal Marxist purpose. The United States could have played one side against the other quite effectively. Instead Kennedy bought the erroneous idea of Chinese belligerence and sided with the real threat, the Soviet Union, to try to destroy Chinese nuclear-test facilities at Lop Nur in Xinjiang Province. The Kremlin refused to participate in the air strikes Kennedy proposed, knowing they would bring on a war of unmeasurable dimensions. In this regard, Moscow’s leadership showed better judgment than Kennedy.”

Is there a lesson here in regard to Iran? In looking back, who besides Saddam and Qhadaffi wanted nuclear weapons and failed to obtain them? Some nations decided they didn’t want them. Some of the former SSRs indicated a desire to be rid of their nuclear weapons, but the USSR, France, India, Pakistan, China, and North Korea have obtained them despite our disapproval. Did we disapprove of Israel getting nuclear weapons or did we help them. I don’t know, but the beat goes on; so, will we like Kennedy want to bomb the heck out of Iran? Or will we protest mightily and let it happen?

We worry about Iran giving terrorist organizations atomic weapons, but we don’t seem willing to do anything about it. It would be safest for us and our allies if we engaged in the Alexander-type raid described in an earlier note, but if we don’t. . . couldn’t there be future room for a Dulles-type “Massive Retaliation” threat? Couldn’t we tell Iran that we have checked all the arsenals of the world and everything has been accounted for (if that is true); so if terrorists explode an atomic weapon in the U.S. or in the nations of any of our allies, we will retaliate massively with atomic weapons?

Lawrence Helm

Thoughts on War with Iran

I just read Bevin Alexander’s The Future of Warfare. He published his book in 1995, but his comments seem valid for the foreseeable future. He argues that a powerful nation cannot defeat a weaker nation if the people of that nation oppose the invasion and are willing to engage in a guerilla war. He uses the Boer War and some others as an example of this. The guerilla activity will bog the more powerful nation down and eventually the cost and disaffection back home will force the stronger nation to withdraw. This happened to France and the U.S. in Vietnam and to the USSR in Afghanistan. Our Iraqi efforts did not fit Alexander’s paradigm because we had support from the Iraqi people. As long as the Iraqi majority wanted to pursue a democracy and was willing to develop an army and police force to support it, and as long as we were satisfied with that result – albeit a result that will probably fall far short of the American Liberal-Democratic ideal -- then we will have succeeded in our objective and will not have fallen victim to the pitfalls Alexander warns against.

In regard to Iran, Alexander would probably favor the German/French/British negotiations there. He favors diplomacy and argues we should never go to war unless our strategic interests are at stake. But if we did have to deal with Iran militarily, the approach that seems to fit is the following:

“. . . And when we do invade, we should bear in mind that our primary aim is to force the enemy to end his objectionable actions.

“The United States may attempt to accomplish this objective by using the following two-stage strategy, a strategy that should apply, in general, to powerful countries invading weaker ones. In the first stage, we would overwhelm the enemy defenses and quickly eliminate organized resistance by regular enemy forces, topple the government (as in Panama in 1989), or disrupt the existing power balance (as in Somalia in 1993). We would immediately bring about the cessation of the country’s obnoxious international (not necessarily internal) behavior, and we would seize the principal enemy leaders or drive them under cover. This would be an extremely traumatic and costly experience to the people of the invaded country – one they would not want repeated. At this stage, there would be no organized opposition because the nation’s leadership system would have been temporarily paralyzed.

“If at this point we were to withdraw our forces, the leaders who would emerge or reemerge would cease international confrontations if only to avoid another invasion. They would be unlikely to improve poor internal conditions, but these conditions would not affect other countries.”

I can see the possibility of a deal here. We could agree to protect Europe against Russia if they will join us in an Alexander in and out attack against Iran. It seems that all we need is for France to join us to get rid of the label “unilateralism.” We had a huge number of nations join us against Saddam, but France wasn’t one of them. Therefore we engaged in unilateralism. But France may now be willing to join us in a limited attack against Iran; if we agreed to increase our protection of the EU against Russian challenges.

“We won’t be able to help you much, EU, if we have to deal with Iran on our own. But you help us out with Iran, and we’ll help you out with Russia.”

Lawrence Helm

Why isn't it okay for Iran to have Nuclear Weapons since we hae them?

Polly writes, “Public opinion can be a fine thing, but it doesn't answer the question of why it's okay for us to have nuclear weapons but not for others? I wonder if anyone polled Germany before WWII and asked the question of whether it's okay to invade other countries for one's own benefit? 91% approval rate you think? Likewise, public opinion was very much in favor of invading Iraq. Lots of people thought the earth was flat at one time too. Lots of people still think it's okay to hit children to "discipline" them. And on and on. If we were serious about reducing nuclear proliferation, we wouldn't be proliferating and spurring others to do the same; case in point, if Iraq had nuclear weapons, would we have invaded them? Obviously not. So, why is it okay for us to have and spend mightily on nuclear weapons but evil of Iran to?”

Consider Polly’s key word "okay." What does she mean by it? It assumes that there ought to be a leveling, a sameness, an equality. Is such a leveling possible or even desirable?

If we look at the world, we do not see evidence that leveling, sameness, or equality prevails. We have seen modern attempts to enforce an artificial equality or leveling, but they haven't proved a permanent good and are in the process of being abandoned. Consider the matter of education. Many Liberal educators wanted to abandon grades. Grades lowered the self-esteem of students who couldn't do well and experiments were conducted in grade leveling. These experiments are being abandoned. Perhaps the fact that our students weren't competing well against students from other countries contributed to their demise. Affirmative action is another Liberal leveling-type experiment intended to enable women and minorities to "catch up" with WASM's (White Anglo-Saxon Males). But these experiments are also being abandoned. Women and Minorities appreciate a leveling in the sense of a "level playing field," but beyond that they want to be judged on merit. They don't want it said that they were granted favor beyond their abilities – at least the most talented and outspoken are saying that. Thomas Sowell and Clarence Thomas are examples.

While it is more a Leftist than a traditional Liberal desire, Communism, has advocated a leveling of society: from each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs. That was one of the great experiments of the Soviet Union, and it failed. Workers didn't work hard enough under that system, and the Soviet Union was not able to compete economically with a system based largely upon merit. That is, one in which the best and smartest workers get paid the most. A society in which hard work is rewarded monetarily does better than one in which it is not. The Soviet Union fell because of its ongoing competition with the U.S. and not because of Al Quaeda's victory over them in Afghanistan (a false claim, by the way, according to Lawrence Wright in The Looming Tower).

Moving now into the relationships of nations, we know that neither at the time of the League of Nations nor the formation of the United Nations, was any desire for “leveling, sameness, or equality, entertained. Had someone made such a suggestion it would have been considered preposterous. What guarantees peace in the world, the founders of both institutions would have agreed, was the powerful nations of the world enforcing that peace. The proposal that powerful nations give up some of their power to weaker nations, would have been considered counterproductive.

And beyond that, in history we see that the times that are most peaceful are times in which a powerful empire or nation guarantees that peace. The Pax Romana is the classic example. Times in which nations are more or less equal are times of frequent wars. Given the evidence of history, it would not be wise for the guarantor of the peace to give up power because of some idealistic belief in sameness, leveling, or equality.

It is helpful to consider wars in two different categories: 1) wars between equals and wars and 2) wars between a powerful nation and a much weaker one. Wars between equals are bloodier. World Wars One and Two were of that nature. There was no overarching power that could exert its will over either side. After World War Two there were two superpowers in existence. Their wars were unequal, brief and relatively bloodless. Since 1990 there has been but one superpower that remains. Would it be wise, or “okay” for this superpower to give up any of its power in the interest of sameness, leveling, or equality? It would be quite an adventure. No such power in history has ever done it. It not only be dangerous; it would be foolish. We know for example, that if we were to abandon our power, large numbers of nations would feel it necessary to arm themselves. If the U.S. abandoned its willingness to protect Japan, for example, then Japan would arm itself so that it could protect itself.

By the way, if the U.S. declared that it was no longer willing to guarantee the defense of Japan, then Japan, which has signed the non-proliferation treaty would very likely renounce that treaty and develop nuclear power. If the U.S. isn’t willing to enforce non-proliferation, then who else can do it?

Now since it makes no sense for a superpower to give up its power or move toward a leveling or sameness or equality of power, why is there a popular argument claiming that the U.S. is being hypocritical for maintaining its power while denying Iran such power? The answer is in human nature. The weak will take whatever advantage they can get. If they are weak they will complain about the strength of the powerful. But once they become strong, should that happen, such complaints are abandoned. John Lewis Gaddis describes this process in Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. Robert Kagan also does it in Dangerous Nation.

To return to Polly’s argument, I don’t believe it can be shown that it would be “okay,” for the U.S. to give up its power advantage over belligerent nations such as Iran. Quite the contrary, it would be the height of foolishness.

Lawrence Helm

Iranian Islamism II

Shiite Islamism succeeded in one respect beyond what Sunni Islamism was able to accomplish. They conquered a nation, Iran. The Iranians welcomed the charismatic Ayatollah as their leader and submitted themselves to Islamism. Iran was the first Islamist nation. Furthermore, since the bulk of Shiites are in Iran, the fortunes of Shiism as well as Shiite Islamism are tied to Iran.

The second largest group of Shiites is in Iraq, but as we have seen, they were suppressed by Saddam Hussein. A minority, estimated at 1% of the Iraqi Shiites side with the Islamists of Iran, and engaged in efforts to thwart the democratization of Iraq, but that failed. The bulk of the Shiites in Iraq seem thus far to favor democratization. Iraqi Shiites as well as Iraqi Kurds gave us intelligence information and encouraged our efforts to liberate Iraq.

Shiite Islamists have been plenty violent. Islamism, in the form of the Hizbollah, was exported to Lebanon by the Ayatollah Khomeini. He urged violence in the same way that Sayyid Qutb did. But there were many who thought that the Khomeini might be the Mahdi, and if he wasn't, he was sure to be getting instructions from him. Just as Dispensational Christians are often found waiting atop some mountain for the Lord's return, so are the Shiite Muslims sometimes found eyeing charismatic leaders in hopes that they might be the Mahdi. For if Khomeini was the Mahdi, and he was urging the faithful to go off and kill infidels (which he did) then the restoration of all things must be near.

But the Mahdi probably isn't going to die of prostate cancer and if Khomeini isn't the Mahdi then the urgency to kill infidels is no longer present in Iranian Islamism -- at least that is my speculation about why the fervency seems to have gone out of Iranian Islamism since Khomeini's death. This takes nothing away from Ahmadinejad’s threat, but that isn’t quite the same thing.

Lawrence Helm

Iranian Islamism

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Rezi Shah Pahlavi was put into power in Iran by the CIA during the Cold War. Although it isn’t utterly clear what the Shah was thinking, he seems to have been disheartened by Jimmy Carter’s policies which were not in sympathy with some of the actions of the CIA. The Shah began liberalizing his government and this turned out to be a serious mistake. He opened the door for opposition from the Ayatollah Khomeini and in 1979 the Shah fled Iran and Khomeini move in. Khomeini instituted a government based upon Islamist principles and thus Iran became the only successful Islamist state. At the time we thought that Khomeini was much more frightening than Saddam Hussein. This is why Reagan subsequently supported Saddam during the Iraq/Iran war. Saddam is just a thug, the thinking went, but Khomeini has the ability to inspire a great Islamist attack against the West.

Khomeini did not long survive the end of the Iraq/Iran war. He died of prostate cancer in 1989, the same year that Osama bin Laden (the Sunni Islamist) believed he was defeating the USSR in Afghanistan. Khomeini left Iran an Islamist state, but subsequent leaders did not take the militant stance that Khomeini did; so they didn’t export terrorism in the same manner as Al Quaeda. Also, there is a sizeable population in Iran that misses the days of the Shah. There is a suggestion that many diplomats still hope that this group will be able to eventually oust the clerics that have the final say in Iranian affairs.

Iran is a Shiite nation and it is also, thanks to Khomeini an Islamist nation. Next door to Iran is Iraq where 60% of the population is also Shiite. The Iraqi Shiites fought with Saddam against the Iranian Shiites during the Iraq/Iran war, and today the bulk of them think of themselves as Iraqi and not inclined to be influenced by Iranian Shiites. Since the Iraqi Shiites were brutally suppressed during Saddam’s regime, it was feared that in an ostensible democratic election they might wish to take control and get revenge, so those overseeing the setting up of the Iraqi constitution were concerned about incorporating safeguards. If the Sunni’s who benefited under Saddam had no hope in a future Shiite controlled government then why shouldn’t they fight to the death now – and that Sunni insurgency took a long time to die down. Better to die now with courage than be put to death by Shiites later on they thought. However, the majority of Iraqi Shiites do seem to be supporting a democratic government which will continue to guarantee equal rights to Sunni and Kurd Muslims.

Shiite and Sunni Islamism is roughly the same in regard to the West. Since Shiism emphasizes a Mahdi who will come in the last days to “restore all things,” their Islamist emphasis is slightly different in regard to eschatology. Sunnis see a sort of Post-Millennial success for Islamism as all infidels are eventually conquered and the word of Mohammad covers the face of the earth. Shiism on the other hand doesn’t feel that there will be any marked success until the Mahdi appears; then he will lead the faithful to the success that the Sunnis Islamists hope to achieve by their own efforts. Thus we can better tolerate the Iranian Islamists waiting for the Mahdi than we can the Sunni Islamists who aren’t waiting for anything.

Lawrence Helm

Whether to bomb Iran

As to the bombing of Iran, the prospect of an aggressive Ahmadinejad and a bunch of fanatic mullahs (all following the teachings of Khomeini) is undesirable to an extreme degree. Taking out their nuclear sites is preferable to their having atomic weapons and doing all the things they are likely to do with them, e.g., giving them to Hezbollah, bombing Israel, holding Middle East Oil for ransom. Unless they give up their nuclear ambitions, someone ought to go after their nuclear facilities.

If we do go after Iran’s nuclear facilities, we shall probably do it primarily from the air with bombs. The prospect of our bombing someone always brings pacifists out of the woodwork to hold up our past sins, e.g., Strategic bombing. It is wrong to insist that strategic bombing was immoral in WWII. It wasn't. Allowing the Japanese or the Germans to win was as unthinkable as allowing Iran to have atomic weapons. In the case of WWII, we forced ourselves into overreacting because after WWI we listened to isolationist leaders and got rid of much of our strategic weaponry. We were unable to project the weaponry of a Major Military power thereafter. We were weak and had to do things we wouldn’t have had to do if the political climate prior to WWII had allowed us to maintain a major military force.

It is not immoral to defeat an enemy that has attacked you. We did a lot of things through desperation in WWII, but strategic bombing wasn’t one of them. All the leaders in WWII on both sides thought Strategic bombing was the way to go and that idea continued on long after WWII, e.g., the opinions of General Westmorland.

The morality of whether we should defend ourselves and how is a squirrely proposition. Both World Wars and both Iraqi Wars (if you count it as two wars) occurred to some extent because America was considered unprepared either physically or morally. Hitler considered us a joke. Osama prior to Afghanistan thought we were morally bankrupt and unable to resist him. Saddam Hussein underestimated our resolve and ability – twice. We have given our enemies too much evidence that we are weak, inept, and unwilling or unable to wage war. Ahmadinejad has evidence next door to Iran that we are able to wage war, but he believes we are now too overextended in Iraq to present any sort of threat to Iran. And there remains a climate of opinion in the US that we ought to err on the side of pacifism, err on the side of avoiding enemy casualties, err on the side of not attacking someone lots of people think is planning something aggressive, and so we err on those things and then have to recover in such a way that we kill far far more than if we had nipped those threats in the bud early on. Pacifism has caused more deaths than prudent and timely military action.

Lawrence Helm

Iran and the Code of the West

Writers in article after article present the Iranian problem with considerable angst but no recommendations or solutions. Lots of if/then arguments, but no recommendations. Is there a symbol from our tradition that puts the Iranian problem in more coherent terms? Maybe:

You are the local Sheriff and you have five deputies. You have done a good job of keeping order so far, but Lobo up in the mountains has announced far and wide that he’s had enough of you. He is calling bandits and train robbers from miles around to join him, to build up his strength. When it is strong enough he intends, so he often said, to ride rough-shod through your town. The banker and other store owners are wringing their hands. “What’s it going to be, Will?” “What can you do?”

Well, Will, you know what you can do. You can ride up there and wipe Lobo out before he gets too strong. Do it now while you are able, or wait and procrastinate until Lobo is too strong for you. What’s it going to be, Will?

Yeah, Betsy, the local school teacher hates violence and may not talk to you again if you do this Will, but you know she doesn’t understand the situation. Lobo and his gang will make her life hell if he gets his way. Can you let yourself be influenced by Betsy? She means well, but you know what will happen if Lobo isn’t stopped. So, what’s it going to be, Will?

Lawrence Helm