Monday, May 17, 2010
lying versus bearing false witness
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Other Voices, Other Implications
J. L. Speranza challenged my claim that I admire the French for admiring intellectuals but not necessarily the intellectuals they admire. This person implied that it must be inconsistent of me to admire the French for admiring their intellectuals while at the same time not admiring the intellectuals they admire. Speranza is a subtle thinker; so I am not willing to dismiss his challenge without first examining it. He has his own reasons for questioning my admiration, but since it is my admiration and not his that is in question, I intend to explore my own history, a tiny bit, with this in mind.
While not directly implied, I assumed that National myths are important to a nation's well being. The Japanese, for example, have the myth of the Samurai which is very like the American myth of the gunfighter or "cowboy" of the Old (American) West. They were able to make use of this myth after World War II by applying the Samurai code to capitalistic competition. They have become a modern economic success to at least some extent because of their Samurai myth.
I've been especially interested in myths relating to a Nation's willingness to fight in its own defense. The French used to be a great warrior nation, well able to defend itself. They loved to fight so much that they readily encroached on the territories of neighboring nations. We tend to forget, in view of the France we know as the epitome of a victim nation, that one of the main reasons Germany sought the war of conquest that we call World War II, is because of their fear of a warlike France. Not being admirers of French men of letters, they were not aware, or did not believe, that France was no longer a nation to be feared, that their warrior myth had been severely degraded if not utterly obliterated during the Banquet Years that Roger Shattuck wrote about, and further degraded during World War I; which Erich Maria Remarque wrote about -- it is interesting that though German, the anti-war All Quiet on the Western Front had more of an effect on the French willingness to fight than it did on the German (in 1933 the Nazis burned it) -- and into then the embarrassing and extremely chaotic and largely pacifistic period the French endured ("embraced" might be a better word) prior to World War II.
Perhaps it is an American myth that the French are admirable for admiring their intellectuals. I read some place, perhaps it was Mark Lilla, or someone else from New French Thought that Americans tend to buy books by French philosophers ten years or so after they have been superseded in France. The French "philosophers" I have admired have been the ones (lower case) who have criticized the upper case philosophers such as Sartre and Derrida. Or, perhaps, Marcel Gauchet has moved into the upper-case philosopher-category with his The Disenchantment of the World, a Political History of Religion. But would that make him one of the "men of letters" the French admire? He is part of the group (the Princeton Series on New French Thought has publicized) that rejects the wrong turn I mention above; so he might not be admired in the way that French icons like Sartre and Derrida were.
Perhaps the person who criticized the Americans for being taken in by French philosophers past their "use by" date was British. A. J. Ayer, for example concluded about Being and Nothingness that "Existentialism, on this evidence, was principally an exercise in misusing the verb 'to be'."
In looking through the list I quoted from Paris After the Liberation the only French man of letters I admire is Camus. While I didn't admire his novels, I at least admired his The Myth of Sisyphus -- or at least I did when I first read it years ago. Of course I can't say that I admire the American men of letters (being admired by the French) in the same paragraph: "such as Hemingway, Steinbeck, Damon Runyan, Thornton Wilder and Thomas Wolfe. There was a time when I tried to make my mind accept the idea that Thomas Wolfe was the "great American novelist," but I failed. His novels were great long disjointed things.
Gauchet and Renaut chide the French for being enamored of German "men of letters" -- implying that the French copies were inferior to the German originals.
Perhaps more than praising the French for admiring their "men of letters" I was criticizing my own countrymen for admiring "rock stars." Though Walter Russell Mead is concerned about Foreign Policy in his Special Providence, his classification of Americans goes beyond foreign affairs: There are the Jacksonians (the fighters), the Hamiltonians (the capitalists), the Jeffersonians (the legalists) and the Wilsonians (the political evangelists). The Jacksonian, Mead tells us in an interesting oversimplification, joins the National Rifle Association (NRA); while the Jeffersonian joins the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). None of Mead's classifications include "men of letters."
Someone might say that America has first to produce quality "men of letters" then there will follow Americans willing to admire them. But that is not what the French did and so doesn't comprise a valid parallel. While the American "men of letters" in the list that Shattuck provides were second rate; so were the French men of letters. They seem first rate because of the adulation they received from French citizens. But, someone may quickly challenge me by asking, who is? And I don't have a good answer. Neither do Luc Ferry, Alain Renaut, Philippe Raynaud, Pierre Manent, Blandine Kriegel, Stephane Rials, Bernard Manin, Anne Godignon, Jean-Louis Thiriet, and Gilles Lipovetsky, who without clear direction hanker after the good old days before the men of the Banquet Years and their successors degraded French Thought.
Friday, May 14, 2010
Men of Letters in Paris, after the liberation
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Chomsky joins a hypocritical attack on Obama
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
French resistance
The OED has for "Liberate" "To set free, set at liberty; to free, release from (something)."
The French "resistance" didn't seriously threaten the German forces in France until after D Day. Frenchmen sitting on the fence, not willing to turn upon the Germans until and unless it became clear that they were losing, began to hop off on the side of the allies. It was clear that Germany had failed to defeat the Russians and would ultimately lose their war after the defeat at Stalingrad (Feb 1943), but what did that mean for France? The French weren't certain, but after the successful landing on French soil on June 1944, there seemed little doubt.
However, were the Allies interested in liberating France or in defeating Germany. Stalin kept urging the Americans to start a second front. What occurred in North Africa and in Italy wasn't all that impressive to Stalin, but finally a second front, serious enough to impress Stalin, was established in June of 1944. When we think of Stalin's demands, the concerns of the Vichy French; who were not demanding a second front or even requesting liberation diminishes in importance.
One can always find a representative of just about any position. The French Resistance wanted "liberation," but not the larger number of French people who got along well with the Germans during the Vichy period. So how much credit do the allies deserve for liberating Vichy Frenchmen who didn't want to be liberated? Not much, I suppose, but after D Day, the number of dedicated Vichy dropped dramatically and the number who belonged to the Resistance grew in inverse proportion. That was rather ignoble of the Vichy French we might think -- better to stand before a firing squad or the guillotine with defiant words on one's lips than slink off to the Resistance and hope that one's new allegiance cancels out, in everyone's mind, one's craven behavior during the time of the Germans. And, interestingly, Beevor and Cooper in Paris, after the Liberation, 1944-1949, tell us that during the epuration sauvage many late night assassinations were of collaborators, but others were by collaborators killing off those who could testify against them.
"On his return from prison camp, Baron Elie de Rothschild remarked to the old family butler, Felix, that the house must have been very quiet under General Hanesse's occupation.
"' on the contrary, Monsieur Elie. There were receptions every evening.'
"'but . . . who came?'
'The same people, Monsieur Elie. The same as before the war.'" [Beevor & Cooper, pp 133-4]
One may be inclined to think that Britain and the US were France's "natural allies," but only if one forgets the French period of anarchy and the subsequent Surrealism, Dada, etc. Britain and the U.S. seemed to much like "the establishment," too much like what the French intellectuals were reacting against. Sartre believed he could know nothing beyond himself, at least not for sure, but on the assumption that others were like him, it would be a good thing, he thought, for everyone to band together in the Communist Party. Others, perhaps, had their own reasons, but Communism became very popular in France in the post-war period. The Russians, at least, had never "occupied" France as the allies had.
Francis Fukuyama argued that the end of history had occurred, and influenced by the Russian (Communist) but French citizen Kojeve argued that it was Hegel who was right about that end and not Marx. The "end" was Liberal Democracy (aka Capitalism) and not Communism. France today seems as Liberal-Democratic as the rest of Europe and the West, but they "resisted" all the way. And perhaps "resistance" is a logical outgrowth if their earlier "anarchy." Anarchy after all "resists" organized forms of government, and while France hasn't quite done that, they have give the appearance of resisting still, as though they have made of the term "resist" an intransitive verb.