Ukraine studies Russian, but not the reverse

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/08/window-on-eurasia-ukraine-has-nearly.html

The above article was written by Paul Goble and posted on his “Windows on Eurasia” Website. It is entitled “Ukraine Has Nearly 3,000 Russian-Language Schools, but Russia Doesn’t Have Even a Single Ukrainian-Language One.” I’ll quote from it and make some comments below:

“ . . . Despite Moscow’s frequent charges and complaints, Kyiv pays for the operation of nearly 3,000 Russian-language schools as well as other Russian-language institutions in Ukraine . . . .”

“Russian attitudes this absence [of Ukrainian Language schools] reflects, is an important reason for antipathy toward Moscow among Russia’s neighbors and hence Russia’s increasing isolation in the former Soviet space (www.echo.msk.ru/programs/sut/612419-echo.phtml).”

“. . . In Ukraine, there are 1199 general education schools with Russian as the language of instruction, with 779,500 pupils. In Russia, there are no Ukrainian-language schools and hence no pupils in them. At the same time, there are another 1755 schools in Ukraine in which Russian is a language of instruction alongside Ukrainian; in Russia, there is not one such school. . . .”

“Another measure of the difference concerns the number of people studying one of these languages in the two countries: In Ukraine, 1.3 million children are studying Russian; but in Russia, only 205 are studying Ukrainian. According to Parkhomenko, that number is so low that it must involve students at a school attached to the Ukrainian embassy.

“And yet a third of the comparative figures he offers shows that Ukraine currently publishes 1.5 million Russian-language textbooks and 125,000 Russian-Ukrainian dictionaries each year, whereas the Russian Federation government is not paying for the publication of a single copy of a Ukrainian-language book for students in that country.

. . . Obviously, as Russian callers to Parkhomenko’s program insisted and as he admitted, the international status of Russian is very different than that of Ukrainian, and hence many Ukrainian parents may prefer to have their children study Russian rather than their native language. But the imbalance in the number of schools does not reflect just that. Instead, it is the product of Russian attitudes . . . which have helped over the last decade to “destroy the interrelationship of Russia with the countries around it.” Russia, he says, ‘remains alone, entirely alone ... and not because of conspiracies or because someone is pursuing anti-Russian interests.’ . . .”

COMMENT:

There was a time in America when foreign languages were not studied much. We embraced “Isolationism.” The prejudice of the American “man in the street” was that he wanted nothing to do with other nations. In the foreign service it was often difficult to find diplomats to send foreign nations who knew their language. In Robert D. Kaplan’s The Arabists, the Romance of an American Elite, much is made of the need for those in the American diplomatic serve to know the language of that nations they are sent to.

The Cold War changed the American attitude quite a lot. If we wanted them to be our allies in the war “against Communism,” then we had better learn their languages. Consequently, our government financed “area studies” in various universities which involved studies of languages and histories of the nations the world. As far as I know these Area Studies continue to be financed. Our isolationism is a thing of the past. Today we are intermeshed with most of the nations of the world.

So it was a shock to read Parkhomenko’s comments about Russia’s seeming disdain for studying the Ukrainian language. And do not Parkhomenko’s comments fly in the face of the Radzikhovsky comments we discussed yesterday in http://www.lawrencehelm.com/2009/08/russia-ukraine-compared-to-us-britain.html ? Not necessarily.

Radzikhovsky argues that the Ukraine is the one essential nation for Russia. He uses the metaphor of the Russian lover desperately in love with the beloved Ukraine. Were the “cold” Americans in Russia’s position, they would feel a need to learn Ukrainian. But the passionate Russian may need the Ukrainian to come into the home, learn the language of her mother-in-law and be content. So the articles are not necessarily contradictory.

But if the test of “love” is that Ukraine learn Russian and that Russian not learn Ukrainian, surely the Russian lover invites rejection if he expects his modern “liberated” lover to behave in the old ways.

Russia-Ukraine compared to US-Britain

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/08/window-on-eurasia-for-ukrainians.html

The above article was posted by Paul Goble on his Website, Window on Eurasia, on 8-15-09. It is entitled “Ukraine is Ukraine;’ for Russians, ‘Russia is Russia Plus Ukraine,’ Radzikhovsky Says.” I’ll quote from the article and comment below.

“. . . In his Ekho Moskvy blog, Leonid Radzikhovsky argues that this difference in national self-conceptions is more important than any other factor in explaining why Moscow ‘again and again’ acts as if Ukraine is Russia’s “INTERNAL affair,” something Ukrainians quite naturally view as outside inference in their own (echo.msk.ru/blog/radzihovski/612611-echo/).”

“To feel itself whole, he says, ‘Russian society doesn’t need alien Central Asia. And it doesn’t need the alien Baltic. And it does not need the unloved Transcaucasus’ – although the North Caucasus, Radzikhovsky continues, is ‘an anything but simple’ matter. ‘But [Russian society] NEEDS Ukraine! Even more than it does Belarus.’

“Given their interwoven history as Slavs, given Russia’s self-definition of its history as beginning with Kievan Rus’, and given their religion, Russians are inclined to see Ukraine and Ukrainians as part of themselves, failing to acknowledge to anyone including themselves that Ukrainians do not see the Russians in the same way.

“Because Ukraine means so much more for Russians than Moscow means for Ukrainians, he continues, Russians feel that their love is ‘unrequited,’ and consequently, their feelings have shifted toward ‘a cruel jealousy’ in which Russians are demanding something that the Ukrainians are not in a position to give.”

“Russia is not able to formulate its REAL pretensions toward Ukraine . . . it cannot say in full voice ’Love me!’ And because this cannot be said openly, there is all the continuing blather about ’fraternal peoples’ or even about ‘a DIVIDED people.’ What makes this so disturbing is that it is not just a question of Kremlin PR. This is how millions, even TENS OF MILLIONS of people in Russia feel.’

“. . . the situation in the Ukraine is very different. . . while ‘the Russian and Russian- speaking population of Ukraine does not want to join NATO, [those same people] do not want to join RUSSIA either.’ Instead, they like others in Ukraine WANT TO JOIN EUROPE.’

“Many Ukrainians do business in Russia, and all want to travel there without visas, but with this, the ‘list of their desires’ is exhausted.” They do not want more from Russia, but Russia very much wants more from them. . . .”

“. . . the Ukrainians will ‘NEVER UNIFY WITH ANYONE ELSE into a single whole.” (Joining the EU is an entirely different thing, Radzikhovsky says.) ‘Russia in general understands this. But it cannot accept it,’ and consequently, Moscow will continue to talk about a ‘divided’ nation when Russia should be talking about two. . . [T]alk of that kind could have “AN ENORMOUSLY POSITIVE MEANING” if it were directed to dealing with “the various forms of separatism ‘INSIDE RUSSIA’ but if such discussions among Russians remain focused on Ukraine, not only will the Russians further alienate the Ukrainians . . . but they will fail to address the very problems within their own borders that a more adequate understanding of themselves and of Ukrainians would permit.”

COMMENT:

While reading of this Russian angst, I thought of Samuel P. Huntington’s discussions of “core states.” That is, I mentally fit, or tried to fit, the Russia here being described into Huntington’s thesis. Huntington listed the several “civilizations,” and then spoke of their “core states.” Russia is described as the Core State of the “Orthodox Civilization.” The various nations of a civilization will look to its Core State in times of emergency, much as Serbia looked to Russia prior to World War I and again in their more recent conflicts. The Core State has strong ties to the other states in its civilization. Requests for aid in time of trouble are taken seriously.

We have seen the same thing in regard to the Western Civilization. Huntington describes the US as being the Core State for the Western Civilization. We have seen that the US did come to Britain’s aid in both world wars, and without going into all the ramifications of Huntington’s theory (but largely accepting its validity) the comparison of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship (as described by Radzikhovsky) with the US-British relationship is provocative.

Radzikhovsky describes Russia as an unrequited lover. Ukraine dallies with this love, counts on it but doesn’t return it. Russia is jealous of the Ukraine’s interest in the EU, and this jealousy alienates the Ukraine.

The feelings the US has for Britain would not inspire many to use the metaphor of a lover to describe he US. Britain for much of America’s existence was the Western core state. After World War II Britain no longer had the economy or the will to continue in that capacity and consciously handed off that baton to the US. Britain has ever since been looking over America’s shoulder as a grand master in chess might look over the shoulder of his protégé. This is the metaphor I would use for the US-British relationship: a protégé who has grown beyond the abilities of his master; while the master has his doubts.

FURTHER COMMENT:

When I described Huntington’s thesis as having validity, I mean that it is a useful tool for describing the world as it exists today. Huntington himself made no claim to his thesis being valid for all time. He was sure world history would evolve and one day render his thesis obsolete, but for now it has much to recommend it – at least in regard to the Orthodox and Western Civilizations. One of my reservations (in regard to the future) has been about whether distance must remain between the Orthodox and Western Civilizations. I have the same reservation about the Latin American and Western Civilizations.

The Latin American like the Islamic Civilization has no Core State at the present time. Huntington thought Core States would eventually arise. Perhaps Brazil will become the Latin American Core State, but its language may represent a problem. This is true in an even greater degree in regard to the possibility of Iran becoming the Islamic Core State.

We are on firmer ground when we consider just the Orthodox and Western Civilizations, but in both cases we see trends that are directing power away from their cores. In the case of the Western, it isn’t just Britain who thinks it is a Master. France fancies itself even more of a master, and it doesn’t count the US as its protégé. It has been attempting to engineer the EU into an alternative to the US as the Core State. That effort hasn’t gone terribly well. To make the EU entity comparable to the US, it needs to have centralized power. But individual members of the EU aren’t willing to sacrifice their independence to this French dream. Thus the EU may remain a “convenient agreement among independent states” rather than the equivalent of a Core State; which would seem to make it possible for Ukraine to join it without interfering with its relationship with Russia . . . except, referring back to Radzikhovsky’s metaphor, one is inclined to think of Ukraine as “two-timing” its jealous-lover Russia. . . cut to the Hollywood movie where the cold-hearted beauty tells her jealous lover, “I never committed to you. I’ll see whoever I like and you can’t stop me.” If Hollywood intends a romance, then the jealous lover will be downcast and depressed but long-suffering. But the same scene could be played in a murder mystery, in which case the next scene would show a detective coming into the room and finding the murdered beauty lying on the floor in a pool of blood.

While elements of Western Civilization may one day challenge the US as Core State, the situation in the Orthodox Civilization is different. No Orthodox nation is likely to challenge Russia as Core State. Russia has a different problem. It is on the way to impoverishing itself as it strives to retain close relationships with other states in the Orthodox civilization (especially Georgia and Ukraine). And beyond that, it continues to hope for a close relationship with nations that may have been part of the Russian empire and the USSR but aren’t rightly members of the Orthodox Civilization. Radhzikovsky says Russia doesn’t need them to feel whole, but I wonder how many Russians would agree with him. I am thinking here of Muslim nations inside of the Russian Federation or in the Near Abroad nations. If Huntington is right, these Muslim nations will continue to be sources of conflict (and expense) for Russia.

Israel will attack Iran if US diplomacy fails

http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/full_edition.php?Edition=8/14/2009

The following sub-article appears in the above Global Security Newswire, dated 8-14-2009:

Israel Could Slow Iranian Nuclear-Weapon Drive, Official Says

Friday, Aug. 14, 2009

An Israeli attack could set back Iran's nuclear-weapon development efforts, a security official in Jerusalem told the newspaper Maariv in remarks published yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 13).

Iran is working to conceal its nuclear work and bolster its ability to retaliate against attacks, giving Israel a limited window of opportunity to launch an effective strike, United Press International quoted the official as saying.

Israel, the United States and some European countries have expressed concern that Iranian uranium enrichment activities could support nuclear weapons development, but Tehran has maintained that its atomic ambitions are strictly peaceful.

The Israeli official suggested his nation would not wait for the OK from Washington before launching a strike. Still, Israel should let U.S. diplomatic overtures to Tehran play out before considering an attack, according to Maariv.

Since taking office in January, the Obama administration has encouraged Iran to join renewed multilateral discussions aimed at halting its uranium enrichment program. To date, Tehran has expressed little interest in joining such talks. Washington has suggested that it could pursue new sanctions against Iran should it fail to agree to additional discussions by next month (United Press International, Aug. 13).

COMMENT:

Anyone reading about correspondence between Japan and the U.S. leading up to and including World War II will be amazed at how often the two nations misunderstood each other. Major decisions were made costing thousands of lives, based upon misunderstandings. The same state of affairs exists today between Middle-Eastern nations and Western nations. It is an historical fact, for example, that Saddam Hussein utterly misunderstood America’s position – during the administrations of both Bush 41 & Bush 43.

And today, Iran may or may not be misunderstanding the Obama administration, but it has no logical reason for misunderstanding Israel’s position. Middle-Eastern nations have attacked Israel several times. Who can keep track of the times Israel has been attacked. So it should tax no one’s imagination, not even the imagination of an Iranian, to suspect that Israel is paranoid about being attacked.

What does Israel do when it fears immanent attack? If possible it preempts the attack. What about the preparation of nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern nation, bearing in mind that Israel is so small even a near miss might wipe out half the nation? We needn’t wonder. We have an historical incident. Saddam Hussein amidst threats of what he was going to do to Israel (threats reminiscent of those issued by Ahmadinejad) began the development of nuclear weapons. Read what Wikipedia has to say about the Israeli attack on Saddam’s nuclear reactor:

“In the late 1970s, Iraq purchased an "Osiris class" nuclear reactor from France. Israeli military intelligence assumed this was for the purpose of plutonium production to further an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Israeli intelligence also believed that the summer of 1981 would be the last chance to destroy the reactor before it would be loaded with nuclear fuel.”

Now notice the similarity of the language: The Wikipedia article says “Israeli intelligence . . . believed that the summer of 1981 would be the last chance to destroy the reactor before it would be loaded with nuclear fuel.” The Global Security News wire article says, “. . . Iran is working to conceal its nuclear work . . . giving Israel a limited window of opportunity to launch an effective strike . . .”

Iran should realize that Israel is paranoid about being attacked. It should also know that Israel will make use of the “window” available to it for destroying nuclear weapons of those swearing to attack them.

It may seem from the Global Security Network article that I took some liberties with my title. A strict reading of that article should have caused me to entitle this post “Israel may attack Iran if US diplomacy fails.” But I have merely drawn the logical conclusion based upon the evidence at hand. “Israel will attack Iran if US diplomacy fails.” Shall we not fault Iranian officials if they are not capable of drawing the same conclusion?

"Britain Commonwealth as a Superpower" -- sans Australia?

http://www.lawrencehelm.com/2009/03/britain-as-superpower.html

"Anonymous" left the following response to the above posting, "Britain as Superpower":

Britain's military is as well trained and equipped as either the United States, Russia, or China.

Yes our armed forces are smaller, as is our population, but in a crisis, Britain has many friends. If Britain was in peril you can practically guarantee the support of much of the commonwealth, many of whom share equipment and routinely conduct shared military exercises. Even today the British Army draws a significant proportion of its recruits from the commonwealth, and even Ireland.

Britain has fought for or alongside many countries in the past and these may also offer it military support, Poland and France(though Sarkosy seems to have forgot about Britains role in WW2, and the United States may feel obliged to repay the debt of support we have given them.

Few countries in Eurasia, China or Iran would willingly support Russia against any significant threat unless they themselves were directly threatened. Eurasia makes all the right noises to Russia at the moment, but they would all gain from a weaker Russia. Chinas policy of growing economically without rocking the boat is working to well to get involved in Russian sabre rattling.

All that said I would rather the world powers competed in space and for the future rather than compete over old territorities and historical disputes.


COMMENT:

By "debt of support," I assume you mean Britain's support in the Iraq war against Saddam. Yes that was supportive of Britain.

Probably most Americans would Britain owes the larger debt. America came to Britain's support in both world wars. America's participation in both of these largely European wars (excluding the Japanese segment of the second one for the moment) was decisive. In the First World War, Germany knew America was coming and if it got to Europe before Germany had won, Germany couldn't win. But German generals were convinced that they could win before America got there. As it turned out, they didn't manage it; which is to Britain and France's credit. But then after the Americans arrived, perhaps they wouldn't be up to European standards. Perhaps they wouldn't stand against the German army. So the Germans tried them at such places as Belleau Woods and found that they were rather more formidable than they imagined. So the leadership in Germany rightly concluded that Germany could not win (something the German leadership was not wise enough to do in the Second World War),

As the Second World War began, Britain once again needed American help. But America had returned to its isolationism. Many Americans thought World War I was fought for petty European reasons. Many resolved never to support another "European War." But as we know, Churchill was not to be denied and America did indeed come to Britain's aid.

But I don't see America or Britain as being overwhelmingly in debt to each other. The tenor of my previous note should indicate that we work well together in a war. I am not as convinced that some of the other nations I mentioned have worked that well with us – or would do so again in the future.

Max Hastings on page 337 - 340 of Retribution, the Battle for Japan, 1944-45 wrote, "Remoteness had made Australia a parochial society, but this is an inadequate explanation for the behavior of some of its people. The refusal to adapt to participation in a war of national survival, when Japan aspired to make them subjects of its empire, was extraordinary. Public alarm about home defence prompted the Australian government in 1942 to insist on the return of all its soldiers from the Middle East. Churchill with difficulty retained the famous 9^th Australian Division in Montgomery's eighth Army until El Alamein in November, but this provoked anger in Canberra. When the Middle East formations returned home, they were committed to action in Papua New Guinea. There, through late 1942 and 1943, Australian troops under MacArthur's command fought some of the fiercest actions of the war against the Japanese.

"with every month of the campaign, bitterness mounted among those volunteers for overseas service towards the host of their fellow citizens who refused to leave home. Their own country, they said, had become a bludgers' paradise.' 'Bludger' is a word denoting a parasite, loafer or scrounger. The country seemed burdened with a depressing number of all three, many in uniform."

. . .

"American and British officers arriving to serve in Australia were stunned by the industrial anarchy which prevailed, the difficulties of getting ships offloaded or repaired. 'Many . . . laborers refused to work in the rain or handle refrigerated food and many other types of cargo,' an American official historian noted with dismay. 'They objected, with some success, to the utilization of mechanical equipment.' U.S. Army quartermaster details had to be kept on standby at docksides, lest rain suddenly halt off-loading by civilian labour. Absenteeism among the workforce at Townsville, on the north coast of Queensland, for instance, averaged 18 percent. Some dock labourers reported for work only at weekends, when double or triple pay was available . . . An Australian docker handled just a quarter of the average daily cargo shifted by an American soldier."

. . .

"Almost half a million days' production was lost through strikes in 1942 and the first half of 1943, many of these in the docks and mines. Coal output fell substantially. By November 1943, no Japanese submarine had launched an attack in Australian waters for five months, yet Australian ships' crews refused to put to sea without naval escort, and downed tools to enforce their point. Americans were increasingly disgusted by what they perceived as Australian pusillanimity. MacArthur said: 'I tell you, those Australians won't fight.' . . . In September 1944 the Sydney Morning Herald published a dispatch from India, saying that British and American servicemen were asked whether Australia was 'pulling right out of the war.' This report provoked a question in the Senate in Canberra on 13 September, demanding 'whether the Australian Army was to take any further part in the war.' . . ."

"In some degree, Australian behavior reflected a crisis of national purpose and identity. Beyond this, there was frustration that, while their country's men were expected to fight, its leaders were denied a significant voice in Allied decision-making."

FURTHER COMMENT:

Max Hastings strives to be objective, even when it is painful for him – as it obviously is when he describes Australia's role in the war with Japan. He cannot understand why Australia wouldn't enthusiastically support a war against a nation that fully intended, should it win, to conquer and enslave the Australians.

Ten years after these events, I was stationed in Korea very near an Australian outfit. I liked their beer and their attitude, and they said they thought they were much more like American Marines than the soldiers they had met from an American Army unit. I have been partial to Australians ever since. So how shall I account for the behavior Hastings describes?

We all have our bludgers. America has them in abundance. But I'd like to think that few of them would want to go into the Marine Corps, even if the Marines would accept them. And Hastings describes Australian unites that distinguished themselves in the war against Japan; so the Australians were able to field competent fighting units. But apparently they were peppered by enough bludgers to put MacArthur off. He lost confidence in them. Whether MacArthur was being fair I don't know. Hastings is not an admirer of MacArthur.

I do take note of the idea that the Australians were not given a seat at the war-table. That was wrong, and should we ever have another war like WWII, that error should not be repeated. Any sort of amalgamation like I imagine should be a free one. British, American, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand should join together because they have a common cause. Probably British or American Generals should lead these efforts because they have the equipment, men and training, but Australia, Canada, and New Zealand should be given however much voice it takes to make them comfortable. The way the Americans and British worked in Iraq seems a good template. Let them decide who is to take on which segment of the war and then let them operate largely independently.

But I agree with the final statement of Anonymous, assuming I understand it correctly. I had these thoughts about Britain as a Superpower while in discussions with Michael Kuznetsov about Russia being a modern Superpower. But I sincerely hope that we never again have a WWII-type war. I do think we should spend our efforts moving into space. Perhaps "competition" would be a good thing, but I hope it could be friendly competition: "You Brits have got your Martian city up and running before we Americans have" – that sort of thing.

New Georgian War could destroy Russia

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/08/window-on-eurasia-new-georgian-war.html

The above article, posted on Paul Goble’s web site, is entitled “a New Georgian War Could Destroy Russia the Way Afghan Conflict Did the USSR, Latynina Warns.” I’ll quote from this article and comment below:

“. . . A new war with Georgia, something Russian officials and commentators are increasingly talking about, could have the same impact on the Russian Federation that the invasion of Afghanistan had on the USSR, according to Yuliya Latynina, a Moscow commentator who specializes on the Caucasus.”

“. . . Latynina suggests this risk is all the greater because Moscow does not now control the republics of the North Caucasus within the borders of the Russian Federation and thus does not see how the problems arising from a new Georgian war could spread northward (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4A827880091EB).”

“. . . The Russian powers that be, she continues, “constantly declare that [they] are concerned about a new attack by Georgia.” But what this “literally means” is that “’We are not against beginning yet another war.’” And she reminds that these “declarations” are being made when the news from Chechnya, Daghestan, and Ingushetia is truly disturbing.”

“. . . Meanwhile in Ingushetia and Daghestan, the security situations are equally dire but different. In the former, a civil war is continuing, one that began under former republic President Murat Zyazikov and that his successor Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has only been a little able so far to overcome. And in Daghestan . . . [there are] Islamist extremists receiving “large sums directly from the republic budget” and enjoying the protection of both officials and big business in that ethnically diverse region.

“As for the breakaway republic of South Ossetia, the ostensible cause of the Russian-Georgian war a year ago, Latynina says that ‘Russia does not control” its president, cannot force him to stop the thieving or to begin reconstruction, and must deal with a population that has been kept “in the position of constant military hysteria.’

“. . . there could in fact be a new war between Moscow and Tbilisi even though . . . such a conflict would have every chance of ‘becoming for Russia that which the invasion of Afghanistan became for the USSR,” a step that would lead to the disintegration of Russia itself.”

". . . In her Kasparov.ru interview, Latynina does not mention what may be an even more disturbing reality about the relationship of the North Caucasus and the South Caucasus. Over the course of the last three centuries, Russia has never been able to control the former until and unless it controlled the latter, a pattern that points to still more crises ahead.”

“. . . fewer news organizations are covering the conflicts on the ground. The latest to pull out is Moscow’s “Novaya gazeta” which, after blasting Moscow for appearing to have given out “a license for murder” to local elites, announced today that it was suspending the work of its journalists in Chechnya (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/087/16.html ).”

COMMENT:

I thought it one of the tragedies of Japan’s modern development that they came to the idea of “empire” late. They could see that Britain and France had seemingly vibrant empires and set about carving one out for themselves. What they could not see is that the age of empire was nearing its end. They started a very bloody war to obtain an empire that would prove costly and troublesome to them, had WWII not taken it from them. The only nation that has not been thoroughly convinced that empires are costly and troublesome is Russia.

I’ve read several articles about Russia recently that in summary warn that various elements of the Russian Federation are, or will become, costly and troublesome -- as they have civil wars, wars with their neighbors or seek independence. Is Russia so rich that it can afford that cost and trouble? I don’t think so. And yet the current administration in Russia doesn’t seem afraid (as Latynina tells us) of having another war in Georgia. Why is that? Does this administration think that such a war will unite Russia and make things easier? Does it think it will be worth the cost? Latynina doesn’t think so and neither do I.

Perhaps I don’t think so because I have seen what it has cost us to fight wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We started out the richest nation in the world, and perhaps we still are, but we have accrued a debt it will take some time to pay off. Russia is a long way from being the richest nation in the world. Can it afford to fight a costly war in Georgia? We may very well find out. And if Russia impoverishes itself in a war with Georgia, maybe even enlisted men will be looking for work in the US army.

Russian Officers seek service in US Army?

http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/08/window-on-eurasia-sakhalin-residents.html

The above article was posted by Paul Goble on his website and entitled, “Sakhalin Residents Petition to Have their Territory Transferred to Japan.” I’ll quote several bits of it and comment below:

“A group of Sakhalin residents, after a visit to Tokyo, are not only studying Japanese but also collecting signatures on a petition asking that Moscow hand over their island to Japan so that they can live and raise their children in a rich, modern country that is not fighting a war with anyone else.

“This remarkable action surfaced today when radical Moscow commentator Valeriya Novodvorskaya reported in her Grani.ru column that one of the organizers, who she indicated had to remain anonymous for obvious reasons, had approached her to ask to whom he should forward their appeal ( grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.155386.html ).

“Novodvorskaya said that she advised him to “send the signatures to the Japanese emperor” where they could serve as “compensation” for the harm that Japan has experienced at Russia’s hands given Moscow’s continuing unwillingness ever to return the four islands Soviet forces seized at the end of World War II.”

“. . . Russia . . . [during WWII] managed to seize not [merely a] small group of islands but “a good chunk of Poland in the form of Western Ukraine and Belarus and also Bessarabia, that is, Moldova” – areas that passed out of Moscow’s ‘pirate hands’ only after 1991 when those countries became independent.

“But if those territories now are in the hands of others . . .’another war prize Moscow took in is not: Vyborg. That was land Stalin seized from Finland during the winter war, an action for which the Soviet Union was excluded from the League of Nations! So why should Vyborg not be returned to Finland?’

“. . . Only Gennady Burbulis in the early 1990s was prepared to return the four islands to Japan, and after he was attacked by the nationalists and not defended by then-President Boris Yeltsin, no one else in that camp has shown much interest in taking the risk of backing the idea.

“. . . in the near future, Novodvorskaya suggested, they and other Russians may have to face up to more demands of this kind. Many in Kaliningrad have “long been [been] dreaming about their return to the world of the first European economy, and they have an organization that is pressing for . . . that.

“. . . the Far East routinely looks toward America and as this case showed even toward Japan . . . The Caucasus is also looking for a way out, and it is even possible, she suggested, that people in Eastern and Western Siberia are thinking that way as well.

“’. . . those considering leaving are to be found in the military and defense sector,’ where some senior officers . . . sent a declaration to the US saying that they wanted to serve in the American army.’

“Thus, ‘the collection of signatures on Sakhalin is not a rarity. Soon they will begin to be collected in Moscow.” And according to Novodvorskaya, just one thing remains: ‘to divide up the territory and people of Russia among the United States, Japan and the European Union’ so that the Russian people will be able to live better. . . .”

COMMENT:

Novodvorskaya is obviously a satirist but she is working, it seems, with real events. The people of Sakhalin, if their petition represents a majority opinion, would like to be returned to Japan. But other Federation elements are at least speaking of wanting release as well. We considered the Caucasus a few days ago, but Novodvorskaya also mentions Kaliningrad and Eastern and Western Siberia. Is Novodvorskaya a critic who is enjoying making mountains out of the minor grumblings of ant hills, or is there something more serious behind what she says?

Are there really Russian officers who have applied for service in the U.S. Army? That is very interesting if true. The US has a great number of “illegal aliens,” that have come into the US from Mexico – though many of them come from countries further south. We have a policy that if any of these immigrants serve an enlistment in our military, they will be granted citizenship. I’m sure the same right would be granted Russians who serve in our military. I am in favor of it. Let them come. I suspect we have open enlistments that need to be filled. This would be a good way to fill them. Also, this could be a way to build closer ties with Russia – not the current regime, of course. Such a “military drain” would be a reflection on Putin and Medvedev. But such officers, if they did what is Novodvorskaya suggests, would be sure to travel back and forth between Russia and the US, and that would be a good thing.

Of course the prospect of Russian officers wanting to join US forces implies that they think there will be plenty of work for them here with us. The Russian military is being used today to guard the Russian borders against who knows what and of suppressing “near abroad” countries that would like to become independent of the Russian Federation. Over here in the U.S. we invade Rogue States and chase Islamists about the Middle East and wherever else them might go. I assumed we would be slacking off in those endeavors now that we have Obama as president, but perhaps not.

Nietzsche and Japanese War Crimes

Friedrich Nietzsche in Human, all too Human writes critically of philosophers, but his criticism could be applied to our understanding of Japan during its modern wars – as I will attempt to show.

[from pages 14-15 of the Faber and Lehman translation – published by the University of Nebraska Press]

“All philosophers suffer from the same defect, in that they start with present-day man and think they can arrive at their goal by analyzing him. Instinctively they let ‘man’ hover before them as an aeterna veritas [eternal truth], something unchanging in all turmoil, a secure measure of things. But everything the philosopher asserts about man is basically no more than a statement about man within a very limited time span. A lack of historical sense is the congenital defect of all philosophers. Some unwittingly even take the most recent form of man, as it developed under the imprint of certain religions or even certain political events, as the fixed form from which one must proceed. They will not understand that man has evolved, that the faculty of knowledge has also evolved, while some of them even permit themselves to spin the whole world from out of this faculty of knowledge.

“Now, everything essential in human development occurred in primeval times, long before those four thousand years with which we are more or less familiar. Man probably hasn’t changed much more in these years. But the philosopher sees ‘instincts’ in present-day man, and assumes that they belong to the unchangeable facts of human nature, that they can, to that extent prove a key to the understanding of the world in general. This entire teleology is predicated on the ability to speak about man of the last four thousand years as if he were eternal, the natural direction of all things in the world from the beginning. But everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, nor are there any absolute truths. Thus historical philosophizing is necessary henceforth, and the virtue of modesty as well.”

COMMENT:

Nietzsche wrote Human, all too Human in 1878 and yet the defect he describes hasn’t been rectified to any marked degree in all the years since then. We still view man from what we see, or think we see, around us today. If we believe a certain thing to be true today; then, social commentators will tell us, those who fell short of this belief in the past are to be condemned. We make no allowances for development, or “evolution” as Nietzsche calls it. And yet social evolution takes place, and it is a defect in us if we assume that it hasn’t.

So what are we to think of earlier periods, or of people who haven’t evolved quite as we have in the West? Our tendency is to condemn them, or assume that the truest of them, and we can always find a few, are those who thought as we do today.

Japanese history was not integrated to any great degree with the nations across the ocean from them. They probably left the mainland from Korea in several waves of immigration and drove the native Ainu further and further north until today what is left of them live on the northern-most island. They were influenced by Chinese literature and philosophy, but this influence was largely a matter of taking the literature back to Japan with them and studying it there – not through constant contact with the Chinese. There were several attempts made by the Chinse to invade Japan; so Japan mistrusted the foreigner and wanted little to do with him; which meant among other things that Japanese history is unique. They were an intellectual, sophisticated people, but they kept to themselves – until Admiral Perry showed up in 1870 and demanded that they open themselves up to Western trade.

They did open themselves up. There was resistance, to be sure – Samurais not wanting to give up the old ways, but resistance was defeated and Japan Westernized itself -- accepting Western ways and technology that they deemed superior to the Japanese ways. They developed quickly. In 1877 a civil war was fought between Samuaris of the old way (who fought with swords) and new Samuaris who accepted the Western way of war (and fought with guns). The former were defeated.

The Japanese have always been proud of their fighting ability. They defeated the Russians in 1905 – until they ran out of soldiers – but, they told themselves, they were tricked into accepting something less than complete victory. So they prepared for future wars. What did they want? What they saw in the West, of course. They wanted an empire like those of Britain, France and Germany. They believed that they were a Holy People who were destined for great things. They weren’t trying to be as good as Britain or France. They started from the assumption that they were better.

Lest you feel inclined to indulge in the defect Nietzsche has criticized, let’s understand that there wasn’t anything “wrong” with what the Japanese were doing in any absolute sense. In order to call them wrong, we must apply standards that were not part of Japanese history – Christian standards for example. Jesus spoke of loving one’s enemy and of being merciful. That wasn’t part of the Japanese tradition. They were cruel to their enemies and unmerciful.

When we read a book that graphically describes how the Japanese treated their enemies, such as Max Hastings Retribution, the Battle for Japan, 1944-45, we westerners are appalled at how the Japanese behaved. I don’t exempt myself from that. I was appalled also, but at the same time I mentioned being a bit unhappy with Hastings for not providing us with a better perspective of those matters. He seems to know about them. He was aware of Japanese history and why they developed differently, but in the end, in his final chapter, he condemns them. And his condemnation is that very defect Nietzsche describes. He condemns them for not meeting Western standards of behavior.

Let me hasten to say that I disagree with the Anti-American leftists who think all beliefs are equal. Nietzsche would have at once seen through that intellectual muddle. Yes, there are many histories. And there is no absolute right one against which all others must be judged. But they are not all equal. At least none of us who feel strongly about this matter believe that they are. We in the West, for example, see our way as being superior to the others – the Japanese included. Ours has evolved further, we believe. We have criticized the Japanese for their treatment of enemies because, in effect (though we didn’t say so), they failed to meet our more advanced standards. They have after the end of their war signed up to our Western standards. Henceforth they will treat their prisoners of war (should they ever have any again) with mercy.

Since I have selected this one issue, the Japanese treatment of prisoners, I should add that the Chinese treat prisoners well, when they are functioning in accordance with their traditions. The Russians also treat prisoners well, at least they believe that they should (also being Christian) except when the greater good of Stalinism got in the way of that for awhile.

Anti-American Leftists will with justification accuse me of believing in “might makes right.” Well of course might makes right. Those who are defeated don’t get to choose the evolutionary course they must take from thence forth.