Meade's competition with Sheridan

Meade along with virtually everyone else was enormously impressed by Sheridan's spectacular success at Cedar Creek. On page 221 of The Last Citadel Trudeau writes, "The idea that would become the grand movement of October 27 was suggested to Grant by George Meade, in a conversation they had on the evening of October 23. The Army of the Potomac's commander was acutely conscious that his prestige was at an all-time low: 'I undoubtedly do not occupy the position I did after the battle of Gettysburg,' he had written to his wife on October 13. Rumors abounded that he would soon be relieved of his command. 'I saw General Grant to-day,' Meade related on October 19, 'and we had a laugh over the ridiculous canard of my being relieved.' There was a bitter edge to Meade's laughter, though, and Sheridan's impressive come-from-behind victory at Cedar Creek did not help matters. With one eye fixed warily on the promotion ladder, Meade wrote home that the success would 'place Sheridan in a position that it will be difficult for any other general to approach.'"

On page 222 Trudeau writes, "A victory would silence his critics, Meade believed, and intelligence reports he had received suggested Federal lodgement on Peebles Farm, Robert E. Lee had put his men to work extending the Confederate defensive line as far south as Hatcher's Run; the impression gleaned by Federal scouts, and from POW interrogations, was that a large section of the lower end of this line was barely scratched out and would provide no obstacle to a serious attack. That evening, Meade suggested to Grant that the Army of the Potomac move against this position and close the ring around Petersburg. The more Grant thought about it, the more he liked the idea. . . ."

It would be difficult to describe all the things that went wrong with conduct of Meade's plan in this short note, but the impression I got in reading of the events, is that a huge distance existed between Meade, who created the plan, and those charged with carrying it out. He chose generals to attack the Confederate forces and yet most of them didn't exert the requisite aggression.

And why would Meade choose Warren for a key role in the battle that was to redeem his reputation? From what I read elsewhere, Meade should have known better by this time. Trudeau writes, "Warren's leadership had been both prudent and lackluster. As Grant's military secretary, Adam Badeau, later observed, 'Warren never seemed to appreciate the tremendous importance, in battle, of time. He elaborated and developed, and prepared, as carefully and cautiously and deliberately in the immediate presence of the enemy as if there was nothing else to do, and, while he was preparing and looking out for his flanks, the moment in which victory was possible usually slipped away."

According to Warren, he was going into battle with a substantial number of unqualified troops, soldiers he had no confidence in. If this were true, why didn't Meade know it? And if he knew it, why didn't he adjust his plan.

"Warren's men now marched after Parke's and Hancock's. Their commander's confidence in them was seriously limited; according to his anxious accounting, of the 11,000 Fifth Corps troops taking part in the operation, some 3,913 -- almost 36 percent -- had 'never fired off a musket.' Yet Warren's aggressive support of Parke (should he break through) or Hancock (should his flank swing prove to be the primary blow) would be crucial to the success of either."

Comment: There was a "primary blow," but it was against Hancock. Hancock was severely hammered and afterward on a dark night near stygian woods he had to decide to whether to hang on and rely upon the timely appearance of Warren -- or retreat. He "had little faith that Warren's men would join him in time to meet the Confederate onslaught he expected at dawn."

Few would disagree with Hancock on his point. So, having lost most of his force, Hancock pulled out . . . His "retreat was a perfect stampede . . . Their dead were left unburied, hundreds of wounded were abandoned, guns, cartridge boxes, ammunition . . . strewed the ground. . . ."

"To the end of his life, Winfield Hancock remained bitter about the failure of Parke and Warren 'to hold the enemy close to their entrenchments in their fronts. . . . The troops that attacked me were taken from the entrenchments in front of Generals Parke and Warren . . ."

An admirer of Grant who is also critical of the accuracy of Sheridan's dispatches should examine Grant's report of Meade's defeat. Trudeau writes, "The face-saving began almost immediately. All the Union dispatches referred to the action north of the James as a simple demonstration, while the fighting south of the river was defined as the result of a 'reconnaissance in force.' Hancock's action near Burgess' Mill, Grant reported to Washington, was a 'decided success. He repulsed the enemy in his position, holding possession of the field until midnight, when he commenced withdrawing.'"

On page 252 Trudeau writes "Few soldiers bought the official line. . . Charles Wainwright, wrote in his diary that the 'newspapers try to make the best of our failure last week, taking their cue from Grant's dispatch to Washington in which he calls the move a 'reconnaissance.' This affords a vast deal of amusement in the army, considering there were greater exertions and preparations for this expedition than any previous one.'"

Meade's plan was apparently a good one. Grant liked it and afterward Colonel Wainright writes that it was a good one, but it failed. Two key generals, Warren and Parke failed to be aggressive enough. Hancock did his best but his force was overmatched and those supposed to back him up did not do so. Can a general be blamed for the failure of his troops? General Burnside was fired after the failure of a well-thought-out plan to tunnel under the defensive walls at Petersburg. But perhaps Grant was too close to Meade in the subject failure. He could have countermanded Meade at any point but didn't. He would be blamed by the press, perhaps, as much as Meade would had he been accurate in his dispatch to Washington.

Years later Meade wanted to be made General of the Army, but President Grant awarded that position to Sheridan.

Was Sheridan inept at the start of his Shenandoah campaign?

Was Sheridan inept at the start of his Shenandoah campaign?  Not according to Grant’s “Final Report of Operations, March 1864-May 1865" [as quoted on page 202 of Trudeau’s The Last Citadel]: 

“[General Sheridan’s] operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character . . . but no general engagement took place. . . . Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him.  Under these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.  Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us . . . that I determined the risk should be taken. . . .  I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit [Sheridan] . . . at his headquarters, to decide . . . what should be done.  I met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay, what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success that I saw there were but two words of instruction necessary – Go in! . . . Early on the morning of the 19th General Sheridan attacked General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and . . . defeated him, with heavy loss. . . .  The enemy rallied and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher’s Hill, where he was attacked and again defeated with heavy loss on the [22]d. . . .  Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge.  After stripping the upper Valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg and took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.”

Comment: I don’t see any ineptness on Sheridan’s part.  Instead I see Grant’s worrying that maybe the Washington critics were right, maybe Sheridan was too inexperienced to take on Lee’s Bad Old Man.  If Sheridan were to lose it would be a disaster for the Union cause; so Grant kept him somewhat in check.  Then after meeting with Sheridan and seeing his boundless energy, knowledge of the terrain and supreme confidence he turned him lose with the result that we can all see.

Grant's affinity for Sheridan -- Meade's stiffness

On pages 142-3 of The Last Citadel, Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864-April 1865, Noah Andre Trudeau writes, "Ulysses S. Grant and Philip H. Sheridan were of a kind: both viewed the making of war with the same hard eyes. When Grant came east in March 1864 to command all the Union armies, he placed only two of his Western protégés in top positions with the Army of the Potomac. James H. Wilson was given a cavalry division while 'Little Phil' Sheridan got the whole cavalry corps. Sheridan's unconventional views about the proper use of the mounted arm put him on a collision course with George Meade, and the two scrapped constantly during the Overland campaign, with Grant invariably siding with his cavalry chief. Meade endured this embarrassing situation through the bloody forty days and the frustrating fumbles before Petersburg in June and July. He longed for an honorable release from his responsibilities, and suddenly one was dangled before him.

"Jubal Early's raid through the Shenandoah Valley to the very gates of Washington made it imperative that the scattered Union forces opposing him be joined in a single command not subject to War Department meddling. Meade wanted that assignment, and Grant as much as said that it was his for the asking, but the proud Pennsylvanian could not stoop to request it. In response to Grant's casual offer, Meade replied stiffly that he was 'ready to obey any order that might be given' to him. Privately, in a letter to his wife, he confided that 'so far as having an independent command, which the Army of the Potomac is not, I would like this change very well.' On August 1, Grant told Meade that he was going to send Phil Sheridan north.
"Grant made the appointment despite stiff opposition from War Department officials, who felt that Sheridan was too inexperienced for the task. Lincoln himself, however, backed Grant, and Grant backed Sheridan. When Meade cornered him on his turnaround, Grant said that Lincoln had not wanted the Pennsylvanian to be separated from the Army of the Potomac, since such an action might be viewed as expressing disapproval of his leadership. Meade swallowed his disappointment."

COMMENT: I was surprised to read that Grant considered Meade for this job. Meade was older (49) and didn't seem (at least to me) to have the stamina that Sheridan (at age 33) did. Also, Meade was extremely near-sighted. Wouldn't that have conflicted with his ability to lead a mobile fighting force? Another factor is that Meade died at age 56; so did he still have a campaign like this in him?

Meyer on Meade and Sheridan

I've been reading Henry Coddington Meyer's memoirs. He was a medal of honor recipient and was in most of the civil war battles in both combat and administrative positions. He enlisted as a private and finished the war as a major so he wasn't a peer of major generals, but in his capacity as a staff officer he witnessed a number of interesting encounters. Here is one I found interesting. It occurred in General Meade's headquarters:

"When I reached headquarters I found General Meade sprawled out on the ground with his face buried in a map, he being very near-sighted. Staff-officers were constantly riding up and reporting, and about fifty feet from where he lay I saw General Grant sitting alone on a stretcher. He had nothing to say to any one and seemed unconcerned. While waiting for my instructions, I intently watched him. Presently an officer brought up a Confederate officer, who was a prisoner. Looking up, General Grant quietly asked, 'I assume you questioned him?' The officer replied, 'Yes, but he does not tell anything.' Grant then remarked, 'Ask him if he has a recent Richmond paper.' The Confederate officer said that he had and took one from his haversack, giving it to the officer, who handed it to General Grant. Grant nodded his head in acknowledgment, and remarking, 'You make take him back,' opening the paper and began to read. Just then General Sheridan rode up. Grant arose, greeted him warmly, and seemed deeply interested as Sheridan began earnestly telling him, I assume, the results of his recent movements. Receiving my instructions I then returned to the regiment."

COMMENT: My impression is that this occurred before or during the Petersburg campaign or siege. I was interested in the rather undignified appearance of Meade, lying on the ground in full view of staff officers and aides coming and going. Also, I have the impression that Sheridan and Grant both ignored Meade during this event.

One can at least see that Sheridan was no underling like Meyer who waited for instructions but the peer of Grant and Meade who feels free to rush into their presence and tell them -- or at least Grant -- something interesting or important.

Sheridan and Forrest as rules-breakers

On page 289 of his book April 1865, the month that saved America, Jay Wink wrote about Nathan Bedford Forrest, "And, like one of his Union counterparts, Phil Sheridan, he was also a victim of soldierly vanity. He called his horse Kink Phillip."

It may not be a coincidence that those who admire Forrest also admire Sheridan. There is nothing wrong with a general having a huge ego if his actions support it.

The only general I can bring to mind at the moment who didn't have a colossal ego was Ambrose Burnside. He didn't think he deserved one, and historians typically agree with him. But there are many others who never managed to live up to what their egos told them were their just deserts.

Sheridan and Forrest didn't mind too much if they stepped on the toes of their superiors. Forrest stepped a lot harder on the toes of Bragg than Sheridan did on Meade's. Forrest and Sheridan were job-oriented. They knew what needed to be done and wanted their superiors to get out of their way so they could do it. The bulk of the historians in my Civil-War library (slightly shy of 200 books) approve of them.

When you read about generals who weren't like that, Meade and Warren for example, you will find them complaining that they have not received the credit they deserved. Joseph Johnston, another example, was so crippled by not getting the promotion he thought he deserved (from Jefferson Davis) that he was never able to function up to the standard some writers think he was capable of.

I for one admire and would rather read about the "devil may care" battling of Sheridan and Forrest than the complaints of Meade, Warren, Baldy Smith, Johnston and others.

As to the "rules" Bedford Forest and Phil Sheridan violated, where did these rules come from? In reading about the Mexican War and the teachings provided at West Point, we do see antiquated rules being perpetuated. "Tactical Theory," McWhiney and Jaimeson write on page 31 of their Attack and Die, Civil War Military Tactics and Southern Heritage? "recognized that individual musket fire was inaccurate and tried to compensate for this by keeping infantrymen in close-ordered lines to concentrate their firepower."

On page 40 they write, "Time and time again in Mexico the Americans took the tactical offensive, suffered fairly light loses, and were successful. Close-order musket and bayonet tactics succeeded for the Americans in every major engagement of the war. Whether or not the Mexican defenders were behind field works seemed to make little difference. Every arm of the service shared in the successes on the tactical offensive. In 1859 Henry W. Halleck summarized the American victory at Rasaca de la Palma: 'The Americans attacked the whole line with skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, and the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory.'"

Jomini in his 1838 Summary of the Art of War, wrote, "A General who waits for the enemy line an automaton without taking any other part than that of fighting valiantly, will always succumb when he shall be well attacked." This was a "rule" of combat taught to and accepted by all the Generals who attended West Point. It took a lot of bad experience to convince them that repeating rifles obviated Jomini's rule.

By the same token, the role of the cavalryman had changed. There was frequent mention of surprise at discovering Forrest's troops actually engaged in combat. Infantrymen traditionally scoffed at the cavalry for never getting their uniforms dirty. The infantry did the actual fighting. But that too had been changed by the repeating rifle. Sheridan and Forrest could ride on ahead in advance of their main force, take a position and with 600 or so of his cavalrymen armed with repeating rifles, hold it against the enemy, armed with single-shot rifles and using the old Jomini rule.

Cold Harbor was the last time Grant used the Jomini rule. It was at last realized that a sizable defensive force, well-dug in, could not be dislodged without unacceptable losses.

The Sheridan-Meade dispute

In regard to Sheridan’s dispute with Meade, Horace Porter, Grant’s aide, provides a narration of the event in his Memoirs. I can’t quite tell whether he witnessed the event itself or merely heard Meade’s recitation of it to Grant, but here is what he says on page 83 of his Campaigning with Grant.

“Sheridan had been sent for by Meade to come to his headquarters, and when he arrived, between eleven and twelve o’clock that morning, a very acrimonious dispute took place between the two generals. Meade was possessed of an excitable temper which under irritating circumstances became almost ungovernable. He had worked himself into a towering passion regarding the delays encountered in the forward movement, and when Sheridan appeared went at him hammer and tongs, accusing him of blunders, and charging him with not making a proper disposition of his troops, and letting the cavalry block the advance of the infantry. Sheridan was equally fiery, and, smarting under the belief that he was unjustly treated, all the hotspur in his nature was aroused. He insisted that Meade had created the trouble by countermanding his (Sheridan’s) orders, and that it was this act which had resulted in mixing up his troops with the infantry, exposing to great danger Wilson’s division, which had advanced as far as Spottsylvania Court-house, and rendered ineffectual all his combinations regard the movements of the cavalry corps. Sheridan declared with great warmth that he would not command the cavalry any longer under such conditions, and said if he could have matters his own way he would concentrate all the cavalry, move out in force against Stuart’s command, and whip it. His language throughout was highly spiced and conspicuously italicized with expletives. General Meade came over to General Grant’s tent immediately after, and related the interview to him. The excitement of the one was in singular contrast with the calmness of the other. When Meade repeated the remarks made by Sheridan, that he could move out with his cavalry and whip Stuart, General Grant quietly observed, ‘Did Sheridan say that? Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him do it.’ By one o’clock Sheridan had received his orders in writing from Meade for the movement. Early the next morning he started upon his famous raid to the vicinity of Richmond in rear of the enemy’s army, and made good his word.”

Comment:

Was this a case of insubordination? Grant’s aide clearly doesn’t think so and, apparently, neither did Grant. Sure, Meade was angry, but Porter implies that this wasn’t an isolated case, Meade had a pattern of getting so angry he nearly lost control of himself.

Did Sheridan’s “Raid” do any “good”? Porter and apparently Grant were impressed by it. Sheridan said he could “whip Stuart,” Grant put him to that test, and Sheridan succeeded.

Meade on the other hand was not highly thought of back in Washington. After Early’s raid against Washington it was decided to create a new command to prevent a recurrence. Grant deemed “it absolutely necessary that the Departments of Susquehanna, West Virginian and Washington be merged into one department and one head, who shall absolutely control the whole. . .” This proposal wasn’t acted upon until after George Crook’s defeat at Kernstown. Grant proposed Meade for the job, but Lincoln declined because he had been “resisting calls for Meade’s removal as commander of the Army of the Potomac and did not want to be seen as capitulating to those demands; so General Hunter was left in charge. Hunter didn’t do well; so on “August 1, Grant informed Halleck:

“I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field in person, I want General Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once started up the Valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the Sixth Corps and cavalry division.” This is from Scott Patchan’s Shanandoah Summer, the 1864 Valley Campaign (published in 2007). Patchen comments, “Sheridan’s appointment to command the Union forces assigned to the Shenandoah Valley would bring about the largest, bloodiest, and most decisive battles ever fought in that region.”

In the period between July when Grant proposed Meade to August when he appointed Sheridan he may have thought the two about equal as generals, but after that, after Sheridan began doing the job, I suspected he realized that Sheridan was the more effective general (IMHO).

Trudeau’s Bloody Roads South

I read Noah Andre Trudeau’s Bloody Roads South, The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May-June 1864 (pub 1989) and started his sequel The Last Citadel, Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864-April 1865, but I began having doubts about Trudeau. I thought he did an excellent job in Bloody Roads South, but my red-necked wife tells me you can’t trust anyone who has worked for NPR. That hasn’t been my experience, but I thought I’d do a bit of checking in case she challenged me later.

I ran across the following video from the Pritzker Military Library: http://www.pritzkermilitarylibrary.org/Home/Noah-Andre-Trudeau.aspx In it Trudeau discusses his book Sherman’s March to the Sea; which wasn’t the subject I was currently interested in, but it gave me a good idea (it seems to me) of Trudeau, his approach to study, and his “agenda” which wasn’t political. He believes as others I’ve read have that the first generation of historical writers as well as those who wrote memoirs couldn’t be completely trusted. He noted that those who wrote memoirs years later about the march didn’t say the same things as those who wrote letters home during the march. Trudeau’s agenda was ferreting out ‘the truth’ which meant that he would be challenging a lot of presuppositions made by previous historians.

In regard to Bloody Roads South I began with a prejudice against historians who wrote history based on letters soldiers wrote home, but I soon warmed up to Trudeau. He doesn’t lose sight of the goal, much as Grant didn’t lose sight of his goal. On page 321 Trudeau writes, “Forty-seven days before, Lincoln had wished Grant well and asked ‘that any great disaster, or the capture of our men in great numbers, shall be avoided.’ What Grant provided for Lincoln was a succession of nightmares: the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor. His strategy had resulted in massive casualty lists, and the piteously groaning evidence of the slaughter wheeled almost daily through the streets of the capital. . . .”

“In the deepest, darkest part of his heart, Lincoln knew that the war had had to come to this – a mutual butchery in which the strongest would live and the weakest die. The Confederacy could not be defeated in a normal sense – no loss of arms or land could make it recant its defiant secession. Defeat would have to be total, overwhelming. . . .”

“It would take cold, hard resolution to see the combat through to its inevitable conclusion, but Lincoln knew now that he had found his man. Throughout all the horrors – Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor – Grant had never once wavered, not once asked that he be allowed to pass on the cup of responsibility. . . The Army of the Potomac went on; Grant went on; the war would continue. It was as Lincoln knew it must be.”

Trudeau is very much an admirer of Grant and one of the hardest things, I would imagine, for a Liberal to accept in Grant (if Trudeau is indeed a liberal; which I have some doubts about despite my wife’s assurance) is his huge body-count. He lost many more men than Lee in the battles he fought against him, but as Trudeau said approvingly, “he never wavered.” Most Northern generals would have (and did) back away after being hammered by Lee, but if Grant couldn’t go through Lee then he went around him and Trudeau, Lincoln, and apparently the America Press and the bulk of the North admired him for that. They could forgive the body count, because he brought them victory.

My contrast, generals Warren and Burnside don’t fare so well. Warren tries desperately to prove himself, but despite doing some good work never quite measured up. Burnside is brave and solid but much too slow. He often gets there after a battle is over. Meade is someone Grant can work with but in Meade’s conflict with Sheridan, Grant sees Sheridan as being like himself, someone who will not back down, and gives him what he wants, a cavalry not tied to Meade’s army. Sheridan angrily boasted to Meade that he could defeat Jeb Stuart if he was allowed an independent force. Meade repeated that boast to Grant expecting Grant to disapprove of Sheridan, but Grant let Sheridan have what he wanted which was very much the right thing for Grant to do because Sheridan going after and defeating Stuart would further Grant’s goal and spending time salving Meade’s hurt feelings would not.

Someone else Meade largely disapproved of, Warren, was another matter. Grant gave Meade the right to fire him if he didn’t measure up. Warren wasn’t doing or proposing too much, he was instead explaining why he couldn’t do what was asked of him. Perhaps what Warren explained was plausible, but too much of that was unacceptable. But it took an overachiever, Sheridan (which Meade never was), to actually fire Warren.

The Battle Jericho Mill was one of Warren’s successes and Meade congratulated him and his Fifth Corps ‘for the handsome manner in which you repulsed the enemy’s attack.’ But “Charles Wainwright (Trudeau tells us) was less charitable in his assessment. . . Wainwright . . . felt that his gunners had not gotten the credit they deserved. General Warren has not given me one word of commendation for myself or my batteries,’”

There was never any thought of firing Burnside, but on May 24, Grant demoted him and put him under Major General Meade.

Trudeau was asked after his Pritzker presentation what he thought of popular novels that had been written about matters he has studied. He said that a novelist’s job differed from that of an historian. The novelist’s job was to tell a good story, and when the story conflicted with the facts, the facts were dispensed with. Trudeau implied that was also true of the Ken Burns documentary.