I recently criticized Haig
and Grant for their battles of attrition. James M. McPherson would
disagree with me, at least in regard to Grant. He wrote, “. . . Grant did
not admit culpability for the heavy Union casualties in the whole campaign of
May and June 1864. Nor should he have done so, despite the label of
‘butcher’ and the later analyses of his ‘campaign of attrition.’ It did
turn out to be a campaign of attrition, but that was more by Lee’s choice than
by Grant’s. The Union commander’s purpose was to maneuver Lee into a
position for open-field combat; Lee’s purpose was to prevent this by
entrenching an impenetrable line to protect Richmond and his
communications. Lee was hoping to hold out long enough and inflict
sufficient casualties on Union forces to discourage the people of the North and
prevent Lincoln’s reelection.
“Lee’s strategy of
attrition almost worked. That it failed in the end was owing mainly to
Grant, who stayed the course and turned the attrition factor in his
favor. Although the Confederates had the advantage of fighting on the
defensive most of the time, Grant inflicted almost as high a percentage of
casualties on Lee’s army as vice versa. Indeed, for the war as a whole,
Lee’s armies suffered a higher casualty rate than Grant’s (and higher than any
other army). Neither general was a ‘butcher,’ but measured by that
statistic Lee deserved the label more than Grant.”
However, it was well known
that Lincoln couldn’t find a general who would fight against Lee. They
all backed down or were defeated. But Grant had a reputation for not
backing down and not being defeated; so Lincoln gave him control over all the
Northern Armies, and Grant promised there would be no more turning back.
There never was a time, apparently, when Grant, at least during a battle, considered
the butcher’s bill too high. In retrospect, however, he wished he had
backed away from Cold Harbor because the bill was too high for the little that
was at stake. Did he keep at Cold Harbor too long because of his
promise to Lincoln?
Haig, it seems, was
willing to get in the trenches and grind the German’s down, knowing The British
Empire, had more men at its disposal than did the German’s. Lee got his
men into trenches assuming Grant wouldn’t be willing to pay the expense in
men’s lives necessary to drive them out, but Grant was willing, and when Lee
moved back and retrenched, Grant was willing to drive him out again.
Years later Yamamoto spent
some time in the U.S. and had some idea of its industrial might, but he had a
poor opinion of America’s military might, and he was a little bit right because
the U.S. military was tiny and not very serious. Lincoln had to go
through a number of inept generals before he ended up with Grant, Sherman and
Sheridan and a trial by error process had to occur before America in the
Pacific war found admirals able to stand up to Yamamoto. Lee kept
hoping Grant would back down – either that or that the Northern government
would force him to stand down. Yamamoto assumed that America had no ability
to produce admirals comparable to his. Tojo and his army believed
the same sort of thing about American Generals. Tojo's and Yamamoto's forces were surprised
in island after island by Marines on the ground and Naval support at sea.
Late in WWI the Germans
had reason to fear the masses of men the U.S. was willing to send to oppose
them in Europe, but it was their quantity rather than quality that the German’s
feared. The Americans didn’t fight the Germans long enough to be able to
go through the trials and errors necessary to find Generals comparable to
Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Patton.
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