In regard to Keegan's emphasis on chance. It seems that Parshall & Tully's dealing so much from the standpoint of Japanese
leadership diminishes the idea of chance playing a very important roll. The hubris of Japanese leadership, the fact
that they at the Battle of Midway had gone "all in" whereas the
Americans were back home churning out another battle fleet much better than the
one facing the Japanese at Midway (something the Americans could and did do
many times over, but the Japanese fleet at Midway was all there was. They never again had a battle fleet that
could match the ones the Americans were turning out in abundance. They never even tried to match them
again.).
If all the listings of chance had gone for the Japanese
instead of the Americans they may have delayed the final defeat of the
Japanese, but not by much.
When a Japanese carrier was taken back to Japan for
repair, it was most likely out for the entire war. When an American carrier was taken back to
Pearl Harbor for repair, that repair would take place so quickly it could
sometimes be sent back to the same battle it had limped away from.
Carriers were no good without planes, and the Americans
shot almost all the Japanese planes down.
If I remember correctly, one last attempt by the Japanese to damage an
American carrier at Midway occurred when all they could put in the air were 13
planes.
I have been reading someplace that the mindset of the
Japanese and Germans was similar.
Neither had an adequate battle plan.
The idea of the Germans imagining they could conquer the Red Army by
chasing it over the Urals in winter on horseback can seem Quixotic if we don't
focus on all the people dying. We excuse
the Japanese from folly because Yamamoto understood that American industrial
resources would eventually wear the Japanese down, but he nevertheless
underestimated the Americans to a fatal degree.
Yamamoto made his name because of his "success"
at pearl harbor, but he didn't manage to damage a single carrier, and his plan
was to sink them all. That isn't
success. Also, this attack at Pearl
Harbor that had the Japanese cheering back home, had the effect of pissing the
Americans off so that they transformed themselves on that day from a nation
that was predominately isolationist to nation that was in a brief period to
become the most powerful in the world.
If Yamamoto had left Pearl Harbor alone, it is unlikely that America
would have gone to war against Japan.
America was counting on its embargoes, and it is true they were
hampering Japans ability to conquer the Chinese. So instead of finding another way, or even
giving up the idea of conquering China, Yamamoto took the Japanese into a war he,
we are told, knew the Japanese couldn't win.
Yamamoto's poor battle plan at Midway condemned
the Japanese to early defeat.
Yes, I recall reading in the past that if in both the
Japanese and German portions of World War II things gone just a little more
their way, that they could have won that war, but in the stuff I've been
reading recently, I don't believe that was ever going to happen. Neither the Japanese nor the Germans had the
manpower nor the resources to win.
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